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Executive Summary 
Kosovo remains marked by more than a decade of communal strife and persecution, and the security
and safety of civilians is a serious concern in post-war Kosovo. Though the incidence of reported
armed violence has declined in absolute terms since the NATO campaign in 1999, civilians and inter-
national agency personnel living and working in the territory are nevertheless vulnerable. The widespread
availability and misuse of small arms, particularly pistols and automatic rifles, constitutes a central
challenge to the reduction of insecurity and the promotion of development throughout Kosovo.
Despite the fact that the availability of small arms predates the Ottoman presence in the region—and
despite their central role in exacerbating insecurity in the 1990s and early twenty-first century—very
little is known about how many weapons are circulating, how and by whom they are held, how guns
are perceived, and what their impacts are on individuals and on society.
Acknowledging that small arms availability and misuse represents an impediment to the fulfilment of
its core mandate, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has recently launched the
Illicit Small Arms Control (ISAC) Project. ISAC has four sub-components, one of which is Weapons-
in-Exchange for Development (WED). In order to better apprehend the role of small arms in Kosovo
and to establish measurable benchmarks and standards for the WED, the UNDP/ISAC commissioned
the Small Arms Survey to carry out a small arms baseline assessment (hereafter SABA).
Through a combination of various research and survey instruments,1 the SABA household survey sought
to answer five key questions: (1) how many small arms are there in Kosovo and how are they distrib-
uted; (2) what types of weapons are most commonly reported and misused; (3) who are the primary
owners and users of small arms and what are their attitudes towards weapons; (4) how are small arms
transferred and what are the scale and dynamics of the small arms trade; and (5) what are the direct
and indirect effects of small arms misuse on civilians? The broad findings are reviewed below.
There are an estimated 330,000–460,000 civilian small arms in Kosovo today. Though the Kosovo
Police Service (KPS), the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the international security providers, as well
as various private security companies and a select group of political actors have access to or own
weapons, the overwhelming majority—between 330,000 and 460,000—are held by civilians.2 Small
arms are variously distributed within the civilian population, both geographically and demographically.
Geographically, small arms are more prevalent in rural and semi-rural areas than in urban centres.
Though small arms are by nature mobile, it appears that they are more numerous in areas such as
Mitrovica and Pejë/Pec´. Small arms tend to be stored indoors in purpose-built caches, or buried outdoors
relatively close to households. The demographic profile of small arms owners tends to be consistent
with other regions of the Balkans: men above the age of 18 years.
The most common weapons in circulation are pistols and assault rifles. The types of weapons most
commonly reported by UNMIK Police, as well as by focus groups and surveys, included Zastava and
Tokarev pistols, as well as Kalashnikov and Zastava assault rifles. Though Zastavas and Tokarevs made
up 53 per cent of all reported pistols, other types were also reported, such as Berettas (seven per cent)
and Ceska Zbrojovka (six per cent). At least 85 per cent of all reported assault rifles were Kalashnikovs
and 14 per cent Zastavas. Other weapons types reported include rifles and shotguns and, to a much
lesser extent, rocket launchers, sub-machine guns, sniper rifles, and grenades. 
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Small arms are owned and used by a wide variety of actors. In addition to key security providers, such
as KFOR and UNMIK Police, small arms are owned and misused by organized and semi-organized
criminal actors, businessmen, and ex-combatants. Private security companies and a nominal number
of politicians are also entitled to ‘weapons authorization cards’ and carry small numbers of weapons.
Another category of owners includes hunters and recreational shooters, who are entitled to possess
hunting and recreational weapons upon receipt of a weapons registration card.
Attitudes toward security providers vary among Kosovans. The SABA household survey indicates
that attitudes towards primary security providers (KFOR, CIVPOL, KPS) vary tremendously between
the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb populations. While the former demonstrate ample trust in KPS
and to a lesser extent KFOR, Kosovo Serbs are largely sceptical and even hostile to KPS. Nevertheless,
both ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb children and youth claim to rely primarily on themselves and
on weapons to ensure their security.
Kosovans do not appear to be as attached to their weapons as commonly believed. Though attitudes
towards small arms among Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs vary, the SABA household survey
reveals that 47 per cent of Kosovans believed that there were ‘too many guns in society’, and only 21
per cent disagreed with this statement. Also, over 50 per cent of respondents thought it ‘very likely’
or ‘somewhat likely’ that people in their neighbourhood would hand in their guns in exchange for
investments in their community. Finally, more than 50 per cent of respondents claimed that they
would not choose to own a weapon even if it were legal.
Small arms are trafficked primarily from Serbia and Albania and the trade is relatively low in
comparison with other Balkan states. The primary source of weapons to Kosovo is Serbia (Yugoslavian-
manufactured and comparatively expensive pistols) and Albania (Chinese-manufactured and relatively
low-cost assault rifles). There are several reasons why the trade and trafficking of small arms in Kosovo
is limited: specifically, the high presence of international and national security forces and the low profits
involved, in comparison with the trafficking of women, cigarettes, or fuel. A looming concern, however,
is the weakness of border control, which means that small arms trafficking could increase if the demand
for small arms surged in either Kosovo or FYROM.
Fatal and non-fatal firearm injuries have decreased since the latter half of 1999. Based on an
epidemiological study commissioned by SAS, it appears that the number of reported cases decreased
by more than 50 per cent between mid-1999 and 2002. Although reporting rates are undoubtedly low
and public health capacities limited, it appears that this trend is set to continue in 2003.
Criminality, particularly crime involving small arms, is prevalent in Kosovo. Although violent crime
rates (homicide, robbery, and assault) in Kosovo are analogous to or even lower than its neighbours,
an estimated 72 per cent of all reported murders in 2002 were committed with small arms. This is
extremely high when set in the context of other post-communist states: fewer than 13 per cent of all
homicides in Estonia and 11 per cent in Hungary were committed with small arms, for example.
Moreover, small arms were more than twice as likely to be used in robberies than in Estonia and four
times more likely than in Hungary. It also appears that, in Kosovo, the guns themselves are part of the
problem, since the ‘substitution effect’ (when one type of tool becomes scarce, it is replaced with
another to commit a crime) does not appear to be strong.
Firearm-related incidents tend to be rare in schools and colleges. In a survey of 15 schools in Kosovo,
the SABA household survey reveals that violence is more associated with weapons such as knives and
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chains than with pistols or assault rifles. Small arms only occasionally substitute for other weapons.
Respondents acknowledge, however, the precarious nature of security in many of the schools.
Kosovo faces a wide range of structural challenges, from widespread unemployment to substantial
deficits in infrastructure and education. Although attention must be devoted to a number of legitimate
developmental concerns, efforts to redress the economic situation cannot neglect targeted interventions
designed to reduce violence and insecurity, including that related to small arms availability and misuse.
The piloting of a Weapons-in-Exchange for Development programme in the summer of 2003, under
the auspices of the UNDP/ISAC Project, will be an important indicator of whether a Kosovo-wide
weapons for development strategy is desirable and feasible. Though WED planners and participants
must set relatively modest objectives—given the scale of the task at hand and the risks involved—
their efforts should be supported at the highest level.
The findings of the SABA household survey suggest that any future WED should focus primarily on
pistols and assault rifles, particularly those in the hands of civilians. People in possession of other types
of potentially more lethal weapons, including sniper rifles and machine guns, should also be encour-
aged to exchange their weapons voluntarily for development incentives. Those responsible for any
intervention should recognize, however, the varied levels of trust among indigenous Serb and
Albanian populations. Perhaps most important, the SABA household survey indicates that the
involvement of local leadership and the participation of communities in defining their own security
and development-related needs will be integral to the success of any future WED.
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I. Introduction  
Small arms have been at the heart of the upheavals in the Balkans over the last decade and a half. One
of the most forceful images of the wars in Bosnia is that of snipers killing and maiming civilians in
Sarajevo. In Albania, the most dramatic event of the 1990s was the looting of more than half a million
small arms from army stockpiles in 1997, in a desperate response to the failed pyramid savings scheme
in which many Albanians lost their meagre assets. In FYROM, images of the NATO-led operation
‘Essential Harvest’ often illustrate how war was narrowly averted in 2001. In this weapons collection
effort, ethnic Albanian nationalists handed over approximately 3,800 small arms and light weapons to
international forces. In Kosovo, finally, the armed KLA fighter remains a potent image of the desperation
of the Kosovo Albanians after a decade of increasing oppression by Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic and his followers. All these images of guns in the Balkans fit only too neatly with long-standing
images in other parts of Europe of the region as ‘unruly’ and strongly attached to the gun.
This study examines the issue of small arms in Kosovo. Kosovo is still marked by more than a decade
of ethnically-based persecution and by the NATO-led war against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia that this
oppression finally triggered.3 Kosovo is thought to be home to a large number of guns, many related to
the recent conflict. However, not much is known about the situation in Kosovo with respect to guns.
How many guns are there? Who holds them? How are they traded? What effects do they have on
Kosovan society? How are they perceived?
The present study aims to provide some answers to these and related questions. The study, officially
labelled the Small Arms Baseline Assessment (SABA), was commissioned by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) under the auspices of its Illicit Small Arms Control (ISAC) Project
in Kosovo. It is designed particularly to inform the Weapons-in-Exchange for Development (WED)
component of the programme in the territory (see Box 1.1 and 1.2). It thus serves as a background
document for assessing the feasibility of collecting weapons in Kosovo. However, it is conceived of
as a reference document on small arms generally in the territory, and thus addresses a much wider
audience.
Box 1.1 Generating new information: Data and sources for the study
The present study is based on a range of material, obtained from sources such as:
• a 1,264 person face-to-face household survey designed by SAS and distributed throughout
Kosovo (for further details, see Box 3.1 and Annex I and II);
• twelve focus group discussions with 5–11 participants each, undertaken in four locations
(three Kosovo Albanian and one Kosovo Serb) in Kosovo (see Box 3.2);
• interviews with 15 ex-KLA fighters from all seven operational zones of the KLA;
• interviews with 29 teachers and administrators at 15 schools throughout Kosovo;
• interviews with key personnel within the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government,
UNMIK, KFOR, OSCE, and other actors in the security sector;
• the UNMIK Police database (Kosovo Police Information System, KPIS); and
• the database of the Pristina University Hospital.
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Sections II and III of this study review the general political and military context of the small arms
situation in Kosovo. Section IV provides estimates of the number of guns in Kosovo, a difficult task
given the porous nature of borders in the area and the secrecy surrounding arms possession. The porous
borders are considered in Section V, which focuses on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons
(SALW). Section VI examines the cultural and historical context of small arms possession and use
in Kosovo, including the history of weapons collection by the Ottomans and Yugoslavs. It also eluci-
dates how traditional values associated with the gun have been transmitted to the present time.
Section VII takes a closer look at the various impacts that SALW have had in Kosovo, ranging from
direct effects (death and injury), to indirect effects (such as crime and impact on children in their
school environment).
The main findings of the report are listed below.
• Approximately 330,000-460,000 guns are held by civilians in Kosovo. This number is based on a
rate of approximately 60–70 per cent gun ownership among households in the territory, and on an
average rate of gun holdings among these households of circa 1.4–1.7 weapons. This number
accounts for the large majority of total weapons possession in the territory.
• The most common types of weapons in Kosovo are pistols and assault rifles. The most common
pistols are Zastavas and TTs, and the most common assault rifles are Kalashnikovs and Zastavas.
• Police seizure data indicates that Mitrovica and Pejë/Pec´ are more densely-armed areas than
Gjilan/Gnjilane and Prizren, with Pristina falling in the middle. Geographically, there are fewer
guns in city centres than in the countryside.
• Apart from criminals, it appears that businessmen and ex-combatants are particularly well armed.
Small arms are either stored in purpose-built concealments or buried outside the house.
• So far, weapons amnesties—although this will, one hopes, change—have been lacking in terms of
domestic ‘ownership’, with limited participation of the Kosovo politicians and public figures in
KFOR/UNMIK weapons collection efforts.
• Weapons collection has been less successful in the ethnic Serb communities. This is arguably
linked to their negative perception of the main official security providers in Kosovo, in particular
the KPS, but also CIVPOL.
• Gun smuggling appears to be limited, especially when compared to other forms of smuggling such
as trafficking in cigarettes, women, and fuel. Gun smugglers use the same routes as for other types
of trafficking.
• Recent attempts to re-create a legislative framework for gun possession and transfer in Kosovo, and
in particular the possession of hunting guns, have met with success but are to date incomplete.
• Gun injuries have decreased substantially between the immediate post-war period (the second half
of 1999) and 2002.
• Guns are nevertheless prevalent in crime, and are present in more than 70 per cent of all murders.
• Crime guns are mainly pistols and Kalashnikovs.
Box 1.2  UNDP weapons collection in Kosovo
UNDP is not new to small arms control in the western Balkan region: It has organized weapons
collection programmes in Albania (Gramsh and later Elbasan, Dibra, and other locations).
Along with the Stability Pact, it operates the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control
of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Moreover, it is currently starting a programme
in FYROM and is considering one in southern Serbia and Montenegro.
Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin
Special Report Small Arms Survey 
Page 2
In Kosovo, the UNDP/ISAC Project aims to sensitize the population to the small arms problem,
remove illicit weapons from society, reduce the negative effects of small arms, foster popular par-
ticipation in political decision-making, while at the same time promoting development at the
local level. The ISAC Project is comprised of four components, namely: 1) Support to the Small
Arms Regulatory Framework; 2) Civil Society Engagement; 3) Weapons-in-Exchange for
Development (WED) and 4) Weapons Destruction. The WED component will be piloted in
two Kosovan municipalities in the summer of 2003. This will be the first application of the
WED collection model in Kosovo. If successful, it might lead to a wider WED programme across
the whole of Kosovo. The pilot WED is financed by the government of Japan.
At this first stage, the collection effort under the WED is centred on two municipalities,
Vushtrri/Vucˇitrn and Viti/Vitina. These were selected according to two objective criteria:
(a) feasibility: the likelihood of success of a WED programme in the municipality; and
(b) volatility: the relative need for a WED programme in a given community.
SAS measured feasibility and volatility using a number of economic, political, and social indicators,
disaggregated by municipality. The indicators were weighted and computed into feasibility and
volatility indices. The feasibility index included electoral participation rates, tax collection, and
a composite index of selected responses to a 1,264 household survey (henceforth referred to as the
SABA household survey), commissioned by UNDP/ISAC and conducted across the territory by
Index Kosova in February 2003 (see Box 3.1 for details). The volatility index was composed of
data on crime levels, gun seizures, ethnic distribution, gun-related injuries, and selected responses
to the SABA household survey. Annex 3 lists the variables in the indices; Annex 4 ranks the
municipalities according to the two indices.
The WED is participatory: local communities are invited to take an active part in the pro-
gramme. Such participation will occur at different stages. At the initial stage, the villages and
neighbourhoods must express a willingness to participate in the programme, and must indicate
how many guns they can collect from local inhabitants. They also have to come up with con-
crete development projects and a proposal for spending development funds that UNDP would
provide. The process is meant to include not only community leaders but also a representative
group of ‘ordinary’ citizens. At a later stage, the residents must actively mobilize to contribute
weapons in order to receive a share of development funding.
Some analysts have expressed scepticism towards weapons collection in Kosovo, arguing that it
amounts to ‘an attempt to micro-manage particular aspects of day-to-day security in Kosovo’,
which cannot succeed ‘when fundamental political and security issues remain unresolved’ (Paes
and Matveeva, 2003).4 However, only four per cent of respondents to the SABA household
survey believed that guns were held for ‘political security’ reasons, while 69 per cent believed
that weapons were held for personal security reasons. More than 50 per cent of respondents also
thought it very, or somewhat, likely that people would turn in weapons in exchange for investments
in their community (see Annex 1).
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II. Kosovo: Difficult past, unclear future 
Kosovo is a fragile entity, surrounded by unstable neighbours. It suffers from similar ills as many other
parts of the Balkans—tense inter-ethnic relations.5 In the late 1990s, persecution of the Kosovo
Albanians led to an armed NATO intervention. The NATO-led bombing campaign, which lasted
from 24 March to 2 June 1999, did not resolve all problems, nor did it answer the question of the future
status of Kosovo. Kosovo—while still formally part of the so-called State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro dominated by Serbia—has, since the war, been a United Nations protectorate under the
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). As a consequence, ethnic Albanians, who
form approximately 88 per cent of the population of Kosovo, no longer have to fear ethnic oppression.
However, members of the Kosovo Serb minority of the territory (circa 6–7 per cent in 2000)6 have, for
the most part, not been able to return to their homes. For security reasons, the remaining Kosovo Serb
enclaves are, in part, isolated from the rest of Kosovo and protected by the multinational NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Apart from fear of persecution and the lack of economic opportunities, Kosovo Serbs are also hesitant
to return to what might one day become a separate state with few links to Serbia. It appears to be ‘push’
rather than ‘pull’ factors that account for the trickle of Kosovo Serbs returning: life in the refugee centres
in Serbia is difficult and the chances of finding a job are slim, as Serbia remains in deep economic crisis.
To date, there is indeed not much to ‘pull’ Kosovo Serb refugees back to Kosovo. Unemployment rates
are very high (see Section IV).7 Homes have often been destroyed, or are occupied by new tenants.
The procedures for reclaiming property are slow, and recourse to the courts does not help the re-
integration of Kosovo Serbs into local communities. Freedom of movement is severely restricted, as
Kosovo Serbs often are reluctant to leave their enclaves without KFOR escort. This obviously means
that their social contacts and access to health care and basic necessities are limited.8
Efforts at building democracy in Kosovo have been rather successful. Since the establishment of the
UN administration, municipal elections have been held twice, on 28 October 2000 and on 26
October 2002. Kosovo-wide elections took place for the first time on 17 November 2001. During all
three elections, moderate ethnic Albanian parties, and in particular the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK) of Ibrahim Rugova, were more successful than the more radical groupings.9 The
Kosovo Serb population boycotted the first municipal elections totally, and also partially the Kosovo-
wide elections and the second municipal elections (ICG, 2001; Bieley, 2002).10 One reason for this
was that Serb politicians in Belgrade implicitly or explicitly encouraged them to do so; another
reason was pressure from some local Kosovo Serbs, such as the ‘Bridge Watchers’ (see below), on their
fellows not to vote (Paes and Matveeva, 2003, p. 38). However, in 2002, the highest turnout was in
many mixed municipalities, such as Shtërpcë/Sˇtrpce, where Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs
alike feared the domination of the other community, and thus showed up at the polls in large
numbers (Bieley, 2002).11
A number of seats of the 120-seat Kosovo parliamentary assembly have been permanently reserved for
the various minorities in Kosovo, including ten for the Kosovo Serb minority (over and above the seats
they gain in an election).12 After political in-fighting, the assembly finally elected Ibrahim Rugova as
president, and Bajram Rexhepi as prime minister in early March 2002. Actual political power is,
however, only gradually being transferred from UNMIK to the elected bodies.13 In December 2002,
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a UN Security Council delegation to Kosovo gained ‘the firm impression that local ownership and
commitment to these processes [improvement of rule of law, return of minority groups, privatization
etc.] have been less than could have been expected’. It advised UNMIK to make further efforts to
involve the local institutions and political leaders in policy formulation and implementation
(UNMIK, 2003).
Kosovo’s neighbours also affect its stability. Across from the northern and eastern border of Kosovo, in
southern Serbia, there is a range of towns (in particular Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac) with an
ethnic Albanian majority. From early 2000 to the end of May 2001, ethnic Albanians fought Serbian
police forces in the area. The ethnic Albanian militia, the so-called UCPMB (the Liberation Army of
Preshevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac), was an offshoot from the KLA. A peace agreement, negotiated
by NATO, has lead to a temporary and fragile stabilization of the situation. Nevertheless, 2002 saw
renewed flare-ups of violence in the Presevo valley.
In 2001, Kosovo’s neighbour to the west, Montenegro, threatened to secede from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. The situation was at least temporarily resolved in March 2002, when the EU brokered
an agreement on a looser union between Serbia and Montenegro, under the new name of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The union will be maintained at least until 2006, when referenda
on independence will be held in both regions. Had Montenegro left the federation, it would have been
very difficult to justify maintaining Kosovo within it.14
To the south-west, Kosovo borders Albania, which has experienced long periods of lawlessness
over the past decade and a half, and whose population today is still substantially poorer than its
brethren in Kosovo.15 Finally, during 2001 FYROM to the south was close to full-scale war
between ethnic Albanian militias and the ethnic Macedonian-dominated state apparatus (a splinter
group from the KLA, the National Liberation Army, NLA, was responsible for the fighting on the
ethnic Albanian side). Many of the ethnic Albanian insurgents are reported to have used Kosovo
as a base, and are still not fully disarmed.16 The situation is still unsettled and there are indications
(such as increased illicit funding activities and extremist manifestations) that renewed fighting
might be on the horizon.17
The unsettled status of Kosovo—whether it will remain a part of the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro or become independent 18—coupled with the strong inter-ethnic hostility, has slowed
economic development of the region. Economic activity is strongest around the international
presence (service industries catering to UNMIK, OSCE, EU, KFOR and other international
personnel, for instance), and there is fear that no long-term, sustainable economic recovery is
in sight. At least half the population lives in poverty, and unemployment levels are a staggering
50 per cent.19
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III. Perceptions of security and security providers
Types and scale of violence and insecurity in Kosovo
The combination of regional and domestic political insecurity, inter-ethnic tension, lack of economic
prospects, and its own post-conflict status has contributed to the perception of Kosovo as a violent
society. However, reported crime levels have decreased substantially over the last few years. In 2001
there were 89 homicides (approximately 4.45 per 100,000 inhabitants), 401 cases of robbery (20.05
per 100,000), and 186 serious assaults (9.3 per 100,000).20 These figures are analogous to those of other
countries in the Balkan region and across central and eastern Europe; if anything, they are lower.
However, Kosovo crime levels might be underestimated in official data in view of a certain reticence
on the part of inhabitants to report crime to the police.21 In addition to under-reporting, another
potential reason for low reported crime rates is the significant international police and army presence
in the territory, which depresses crime levels.
Murders these days occur largely between Kosovo Albanian men. Inter-ethnic murder rates have gone
down substantially, and less than one-fourth of the victims are women.22 In this respect Kosovo differs
little from other countries (for details of gun use in crime, see Section VII of this report).
One concern in Kosovo today is that political and criminal violence are becoming interlinked through
increasingly well-organized crime structures. The KLA has been split up, with parts of its leadership
turning to politics (mainly the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, AAK, and the Democratic Party of
Kosovo and the Gun
Small Arms Survey    Special Report
Page 7
Sources: KPIS; Interpol; SOK (2002)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
340
Homicides/100,000
C
ri
m
e
 r
a
te
s 
p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
Alb
an
ia,
 20
01
Bu
lga
ria
, 2
00
0
Cr
oa
tia
, 2
00
0
Es
ton
ia,
 20
00
Hu
ng
ary
, 2
00
0
336
Ko
so
vo
, 2
00
1
Ma
ce
do
nia
/FY
R,
 20
02
Ro
ma
nia
, 2
00
0
Slo
ve
nia
, 2
00
0
Country
Robberies/100,000
Aggravated assaults/100,000
Figure 3.1 Kosovo crime rates in comparative perspective
Kosovo, PDK), and others to business, organized crime, or continued paramilitary activities. But the
split is not a neat one, as business, organized crime, and regular and extremist politics are linked in
various ways. It is important to note that this is not confined to ex-KLA structures. The links are
strongest in extreme nationalist organizations, which are thought to finance their activities mainly
through crime, as most recently through a series of kidnappings.
Intimidation of people in key political and administrative positions is pervasive. This is evidenced by the
fact that it has been difficult to keep local Kosovans in senior positions within the customs service.
Various types of pressure are also exercised by ex-KLA groupings. For example, it has sometimes been
claimed that mass demonstrations related to the KLA (such as the 18,000-strong protest march on 27
February 2003 in Pristina against the turning in of suspected ethnic Albanian war criminals to the war
crimes tribunal in the Hague (TOL, 2003)) would be substantially smaller were people not pressurised
(although not necessarily by the threat of violence) into participating. A number of recent explosions
that coincided with important political events have caused some concern in Kosovo. However, the most
serious recent attack was a shooting. In January 2003 Tahir Zemaj, an ex-KLA commander turned
politician, was shot dead together with members of his family (UNDP, 2003, pp. 26–7).
When asked in a poll of May–August 2002 how safe they felt in the streets, 54 per cent of Kosovans
stated that they felt ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ safe. Three months later, this figure had risen to 59 per cent
(UNDP, 2003, p. ii). There are ethnic differences in perceptions of security, however. While 59 per
cent of Kosovo Albanians felt safe in the streets, only 41 per cent of Kosovo Serbs did so.23 Among
Kosovo Serbs, 42 per cent felt ‘not too safe’ or ‘not safe at all’ at home alone, while 26 per cent of
Kosovo Albanians felt the same (UNDP, 2003, Table A.8). However, there is a general sense among
the population that security is improving. When asked in the SABA household survey whether secu-
rity in their area had become better or worse than the year earlier, 65 per cent of the ethnic Albanian
respondents said that it had improved, and only 11 per cent said it had deteriorated. Among ethnic
Serbs, answers were quite different, with 70 per cent estimating that the situation had stayed the same,
19 per cent that it had improved, and six per cent that it had become worse (see Annex 1).
Box 3.1 The SABA household survey
From 4 to 10 February 2003, Index Kosova conducted a face-to-face household survey with 1,264
people around Kosovo, which was commissioned by UNDP/ISAC as a part of the SABA. Both
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were interviewed.24 The topic of the survey was security, safety,
and guns in Kosovo. The survey contained some 40 questions on experiences of threat and violence,
perception of security and security providers, attitudes towards guns and various gun control measures,
number and types of guns believed to be in circulation, etc. (selected responses to the questionnaire
are presented in Annex 1 to this report; the complete questionnaire is found in Annex 2).
This proved to be a very sensitive topic. Although questions were posed indirectly (for example,
asking about guns in the neighbourhood rather than about the respondent’s own possible guns),
this was the first time that Index Kosova experienced refusals when conducting a survey.
Respondents also frequently asked whether the interviewers were sent by KFOR, UNMIK, or
KPS, and expressed concern that raids or arrests would follow the interviews.
Such process-related problems notwithstanding, the survey produced very interesting final results,
in particular revealing differences between the ethnic communities and various demographic
groups (age, rural/city, etc.), which are highlighted throughout this report. 
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A more complete picture of the causes of insecurity is provided by the participatory focus group
research conducted by Index Kosova for this study in four locations in Kosovo (Box 3.2). When asked
about factors causing insecurity, people did not necessarily evoke crime. Men tended to stress political
factors, such as the final status of Kosovo, limited power of the governing bodies, non-functional
courts, and enclaves, although enigmatic killings, organized crime, and drugs were also cited. Women
more often mentioned fast and reckless driving,25 dark streets, lack of pavements, bad roads, stray dogs,
and pollution. Smuggling, crime, and violence were also ranked as factors making for insecurity.
Children and youth, in contrast, were more concerned about crime. High on their lists of factors were
criminals, killings, drug dealing, trafficking in humans, kidnappings, and rape.
The Kosovo Serb focus groups were generally much more concerned with crime than their Kosovo
Albanian counterparts, as men, women, and children/youth all ranked various types of crime (drugs,
rape, attacks on children, and kidnapping) high on their lists. The men in particular saw crime as com-
ing mainly from the other community. Kosovo Serbs also ranked issues such as transport to and from
enclaves, Kosovo independence, and the centralization of Kosovo26 high among security concerns.
The issue of guns came up spontaneously in some of these discussions on factors of insecurity. In
Gjilan/Gnjilane, unlicensed weapons were one of the factors of insecurity mentioned in the male focus
group discussion (albeit not as one of the main threats). In Prizren, women, men, and children/youth alike
listed weapons among their main security concerns. For women, unlicensed weapons were the top security
concern. The children and youth of Prizren ranked ‘armed people’ second, and the men ranked ‘weapons’
fourth among risk factors. In Mitrovica-South and in the Kosovo Serb focus groups, however, guns were
not mentioned. On the whole, this shows that there is a certain concern with weapons among the popu-
lation in Kosovo. This is corroborated by the SABA household survey. When asked whether they thought
there were too many guns in society, 47 per cent of ethnic Albanian respondents and 46 per cent of the
ethnic Serb sub-sample answered ’yes’, while 20 and 32 per cent, respectively, answered ‘no’ (see Annex 1).
Perceptions of security providers
For any weapons collection programme to succeed, people have to trust those that are charged with
providing security to the community. When asked whom they would contact if their car, motorcycle,
or other asset were robbed, 90 per cent of Kosovo Albanian respondents said that they would turn to
the KPS, and a further six per cent would go to CIVPOL.27 If their lives were threatened the respondents
would do the same: 87 per cent would go to the KPS, four per cent to CIVPOL, and three per cent to
KFOR. At the same time, 30 per cent said that they were ‘very likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to shoot/
attack the thief if possible; 38 per cent were ‘very likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to fight back if their lives
were threatened. Eighty per cent were ‘very likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to turn to relatives, friends, or
neighbours if something valuable was stolen from them or they were seriously threatened. Ideally,
according to 71 per cent of the respondents, KPS should be responsible for security. Nine per cent
believed responsibility should lie with KFOR, and eight per cent with UNMIK/CIVPOL (see Annex 1).
Kosovo Serbs were roughly as likely as Kosovo Albanians to either fight back/shoot the thief or turn
to relatives, friends, or neighbours. They were much less likely to go to the KPS, however: only 13–17
per cent would go to the KPS if they were threatened or had had an asset stolen from them. When
asked who, ideally, should be responsible for security, 38 per cent chose MUP28/Serb Police/Army,
28 per cent local militias, and only eight per cent KPS. These findings confirm earlier ones: in a survey
from November 2002, more than 95 per cent of Kosovo Albanians declared themselves ‘satisfied’ or ‘very
satisfied’ with the KPS. More than 78 per cent showed the same positive attitude towards CIVPOL. The
Kosovo Serbs expressed almost exactly opposite opinions: more than 90 per cent were ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘not
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at all satisfied’ with the KPS, and 77 per cent held the same opinion about CIVPOL (UNDP, 2003, p.
27). The dissatisfaction with the KPS is also underlined by the fact that Kosovo Serbs in KPS uniform
have faced verbal abuse and even physical attacks in northern Kosovo (Paes and Matveeva, 2003, pp. 39–40).
The focus group research confirms this, but makes interesting additions. Since the discussion centred
on security generally rather than on safety from crime, KFOR took on a larger importance, as did KPC
and firefighters among Kosovo Albanian respondents. Family also ranked high among security
providers, especially among women. Men in Gjilan/Gnjilane and Prizren mentioned ‘weapons with
licence’ among important, although not top, security providers. A worrying sign is that children and
youth stressed self-defence and self-defence weapons among the security providers. For the male Kosovo
Serb participants, the Yugoslav army, the Serb ministry of Interior, and Serb police were ranked high
among security providers. Personal weaponry, self-organization, and hunter’s clubs ranked eight, ninth,
and tenth among security providers for Kosovo Serb men. The male focus group also stated that ‘if they
had been given the chance to possess arms legally, it would have been a great provider of security for
them’. Women did not mention weapons, but the Kosovo Serb children and youth, similarly to Kosovo
Albanian ones, ranked arms as the top security provider.
Box 3.2   Focus group research in Kosovo
Participatory research techniques can be used to gather in-depth information on a variety of topics,
including sensitive issues such as the gun question in Kosovo. In Kosovo, such techniques, in
the form of focus group discussions, were organized in four locations throughout the territory
(Gjilan/Gnjilane, south Mitrovica, Prizren, and the municipality of Pristina; Kosovo Serb
inhabitants from Laplje Selo, Caglavica, and Gracanica). In each location, the participants
were randomly selected, and divided into three sub-groups: children/youth (9–17 years old),
women, and men. Index Kosova and Gallup International conducted the participatory research,
commissioned by UNDP/ISAC, in January and February 2003.
Participants were asked to do five exercises: 
1. Defining factors of insecurity: First, participants were invited to list freely all factors which
made them feel insecure or unsafe. In a second step, they ranked these factors in pairs. In that
way, a ranking of various factors of insecurity was obtained. 
2. Identifying security providers: Participants were invited to list all institutions/organizations/
means that they would turn to if they felt unsafe. They then ranked the importance of the
security provider and its proximity to them. 
3. Mapping security: Participants were asked to draw a map of their town/neighbourhood, indicating
unsafe spots and places where small arms can be found. 
4. Drawing a time line (men and women only): Participants were asked to draw a graph of how levels
of insecurity had changed over the last ten years, explaining why peaks and troughs occurred. 
5. Small arms and their consequences: Participants were invited to list all types of SALW that
they had heard of or seen in the previous twelve months. In a second step, they ranked these
weapons to arrive at a list of the most dangerous weapons types. Lastly, participants were
asked to list all potential impacts/consequences of the weapons on the list.
In Kosovo, where there is a range of other information sources at researchers’ disposal, participatory
research techniques are arguably less crucial for the research than in information-scarce environments.
However, as is apparent in the subsequent sections of the report, participatory research in the Kosovo
context has been very useful in triangulating and verifying data obtained through other means.
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IV. How many guns are there in Kosovo?
The various gun holders in Kosovo
The total holdings of guns by civilians in Kosovo can be estimated at between 330,000 and 460,000.
Almost all of these are held illicitly (as of May 2003, only 20,000 hunting weapons were legally held). 
This section details how this estimated figure of civilian ownership was arrived at, and explains how
these weapons are distributed, geographically and demographically. It is important to note, however,
that a large number of different actors hold weapons in Kosovo, and that the distinctions between some
of them are blurred. Apart from civilians, weapons holders include ex-combatants, private security firms,
militias (both Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian), the Kosovo police (KPS), the civilian emergency
service (KPC), as well as the international police and military forces present on the territory (CIVPOL,
KFOR). In particular, distinguishing between a civilian weapon and one held by an individual who
may be easily mobilized into an organized militia during political strife is difficult. Nevertheless,
weapons ownership patterns for each category have been estimated separately below.
The total estimated holdings of guns by indigenous Kosovans (i.e. including non-civilian holdings
such as that of the KPS) can be estimated at between 350,000 and 480,000 weapons (see Table 4.1).
This estimate still excludes the weapons of the international police force (some 4,300 foreign officers
in April 2003), as well as those of KFOR (which had roughly 28,000 troops in Kosovo as of March
2003).29 The above figures imply that the large majority of all small arms are in civilian hands.
In contrast to the other parts of former Yugoslavia, in particular Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, there is no indigenous production of small arms in Kosovo, except for the odd improvised
weapons.30
Law-enforcement and KPC weapons
As elsewhere, law enforcement weapons in Kosovo are a fraction of total weapons holdings, at just
above 5,000 guns.31 With their withdrawal in June 1999, Serbian police ceased to be the law-enforcement
entity in Kosovo.32 Their law enforcement and public order duties have been assumed by a new organ-
ization, UNMIK Police, which includes the international CIVPOL, and the KPS. They operate under the
orders of the international authorities. However, in the Kosovo Serb parts and especially in north
Mitrovica, CIVPOL and the KPS are only partially effective. Instead, unofficial militia structures, such
as the so-called Bridge Watchers, ensure ‘law and order’ (the holdings of militias such as these are
discussed below).
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KPS KPC WAC Civilians Kosovo Kosovo Total 
holders (illicit and Serb Albanian militia
legally held) militia (including the NLA)
5,200 200 (+1,800) 200+ 330,000- 240-400 11,800-15,800 350,000-
460,000 480,000
Table 4.1. Total estimated gun holdings by Kosovans (licit and illicit), 2003
The Kosovo Police Service is a civil police organization with a personnel strength of 5,185 officers in
January 2003.33 According to UNMIK sources, they hold a total of about 5,200 weapons, mainly side
arms (Glock 9mm pistols), but also 75 AK-47s for border patrolling and 32 H&K MP-5s for close
protection.34 The upgrading of the firepower of the border guards is a response to the increasingly well-
armed smugglers crossing the border. The choice of AK-47s has been motivated by the weapons
seizures in the territory, which consist largely of AKs. It is therefore a cheap option for equipping the
police. With approximately one firearm per officer, the KPS is slightly less well-armed than many of
its foreign colleagues: the typical police armament multiplier of 1.2 firearms and light weapons per
sworn officer would have yielded an inventory of approximately 6,200 weapons.35
Created in exchange for the demobilization of the KLA, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), or Trupat
Mbrojtëse Të Kosovës (TMK) in Albanian, has an active corps of 3,000 members and an auxiliary
branch of 2,000 men and women. It is responsible for disaster relief, search and rescue operations such
as that undertaken after the earthquake in April 2002 in Gjilan/Gnjilane, assistance in demining, aiding
in humanitarian assistance in remote areas, and helping in the reconstruction after the war. It has no
role in law enforcement or law-and-order tasks. The KPC continues to be viewed with suspicion in
international circles in particular, dismissed by many as a day job for an insurgent organization with a
reputation for having turned to organized crime (Davis, 2002, pp. 14–15). Charged exclusively with
responsibility for disaster and humanitarian assistance, it is supposed to operate unarmed, but it is
allowed 200 weapons to guard its facilities. As with the KPS, these are mainly side arms and AK-47s.36
Beyond these weapons, the KPC is also allowed to hold a certain number of ceremonial weapons and,
more importantly, KFOR holds 1,800 small arms in trust for the KPC.37 Today, these weapons are in
rather poor condition. Although the KPC has the right to KFOR-supervised access to the weapons,
the organization has not been maintaining them. This could indicate that the KPC, which strives to
become the national army in case Kosovo one day becomes independent, has no shortage of better
quality and/or more powerful guns, or ready access to such guns.
Whether the KPC as an organization maintains a covert arsenal of its own is doubtful, however. It is
more likely that its individual members, or groups of members, have easy access to arms (although as
members of the KPC they face harsher corrective measures than the ordinary civilian if guns are found
in their possession).
Other parts of the Kosovan security sector also hold weapons, but in small quantities. Prison guards
patrolling the prison walls of the high-security prison in Pristina are armed with AK 47s, as the prison
has faced attempted break-ins as well as breakouts. The customs officials are unarmed, although their
mobile units (mainly fighting cigarette smuggling) are to be equipped with non-lethal weapons in the
near future.38
Outside of the public security structures, private security companies also have arms. Those operating
legally can apply for Weapons Authorization Cards (so-called WAC-cards, see Section VI for details)
from UNMIK. It is quite possible that some security personnel who thrive in the grey zone between
legality and illegality have access to a wide variety of small arms.
Militia armaments
The extent to which insurgents in Kosovo are armed is especially difficult to establish, for two reasons.
First, ethnic Albanian fighters could, and still can, shift their operations with apparent ease between
Albania, Kosovo, and parts of FYROM. This flexibility undermines strict territorial divisions of arms
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holdings, and points to the need for regional or militia-based estimates of stocks. Second, the distinction
between combatants and civilians is murky, blurring the one between civilian and insurgent armaments.
This is also true for the much smaller Kosovo Serb militias.
Estimating the scale of KLA armaments historically is complicated by the fact that its final size in 1999 is
unknown, and also by competing claims regarding how well armed it was at the time. Estimates for June
1999, just before Slobodan Milosevic capitulated to NATO demands, range from a low of 8,000–10,000
(Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 290) to a total of 20,000 insurgents in KLA ranks (Heinemann-Grüder
and Paes, 2001, p. 14). The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) received 25,723 applications
for reintegration assistance when it started to register KLA combatants in late 1999 (Heinemann-
Grüder and Paes, 2001, p. 14). According to KFOR estimates, there were about 15,000 KLA members
in 1998, at the peak of the fighting, which seems to confirm the larger figures of about 20,000 KLA
fighters in 1999 (forces tend to swell as the prospect of victory grows).39 An estimate of 20,000 KLA
men is therefore reasonable.
Whether and how all of the combatants were armed (especially the latecomers) is unclear. It seems,
however, that possession of SALW was an important marker, even for those who took very little part
in the actual fighting. According to one ex-KLA fighter interviewed, ‘small arms were… used by some
people to show off as ex-KLA soldiers even though they became involved in the KLA very late or even
joined the KLA after the war’.40
Using the conservative Small Arms Survey ‘insurgent multiplier’ of 1.6 weapons per combatant (see
Box 4.1) as a starting point, the total KLA arsenal at the end of the war, in June 1999, can be first
estimated at about 32,000 small arms and light weapons. A factor that could increase the ratio of arms
to combatants is the pillaging of the neighbouring Albanian army weapons depots by a desperate
population in 1997 (see Box 4.3 for details). As a result, the KLA almost certainly became a well-
equipped guerrilla movement: many argue that it was with the 1997 events in Albania that the KLA
was transformed into a military force to be reckoned with. This is confirmed by the interviews under-
taken for this report with 15 ex-KLA members. While most of those interviewed thought that few
weapons were acquired in the period up to 1997, nine of them indicated that Albania was the most
important channel for weapons after 1997. One ex-KLA combatant describes these journeys to smuggle
weapons:
We went there in different groups, sometimes they were big groups of 50 to 300
people and sometimes we went in small groups of five to 20 people… In Northern
Albanian villages… we would load the weapons (usually AK-47, RPG and smaller
amounts of mortars and field guns) and munitions onto our back; we would load the
horses and donkeys as well. Then we would return again on that road full of risks and
physical difficulties.41
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KLA militia Kosovo Serb militias
32,000-40,000 9,900-13,800
Table 4.2. KLA and Kosovo Serb militia armaments in 1999
Thirteen of the interviewees mention Albania, together with Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, and FYROM, as places where weapons were bought. Interviewees believe that
the KLA seized very small quantities of arms from Serb forces during the fighting, approximately 1.5–2
per cent of the total weapon amounts of the KLA. In contrast, according to the ex-KLA members
interviewed, weapons bought from sources in Serbia amounted to 5–25 per cent of total KLA weapons.
Taking the pillaging of Albanian weapons arsenals into account, the insurgent multiplier might have
to be pushed up to as much as two or more guns per combatant. This would mean that the KLA stock-
piles amounted to 40,000 or more in 1999, which gives the range of 32,000–40,000 weapons noted in
Table 4.2.
Under its initial arrangement with KFOR, the KLA agreed to hand over all its weapons except
short-barrelled, non-automatic ones, within 90 days.42 During the 90-day period, the KLA handed
in about 8,500 firearms and large quantities of other weapons, including: approximately 7,000 rifles
(3,000 automatic rifles, 2,000 semi-automatic, and 2,000 bolt-action), approximately 300 side
weapons (mostly semi-automatic pistols), 700 machine guns (most of them light), 200 mortars, some
300 anti-tank weapons, fewer than 20 air-defence weapons, 27,000 grenades, and more than 1,200
mines. Moreover, more than six million rounds of SALW ammunition were handed in. Confiscation
from the KLA started during those 90 days, and yielded more than a thousand rifles, almost 400
pistols and revolvers, and lesser numbers of machine guns, anti-tank weapons, grenades, mines, and
ammunition.43
The relatively low numbers of arms handed over by the KLA were explained by the KLA military
commander Agim Ceku in the following terms:
At the end of the bombing campaign, we had 20,000 soldiers, but many of those,
maybe even 50 percent, were drafted and had no arms. They had to share one
weapon. We were never short of fighters, but had the problem of weapons—both in
quantity and in quality. (Cited in Heinmann-Grueder and Paes, 2001, p. 19.)
Nevertheless, there is wide agreement that the KLA was not fully disarmed (Ripley, 2000, p. 21;
Heinmann-Grueder and Paes 2001, especially pp. 19–21), something that the above estimates also
indicate: if the KLA did indeed possess around 32,000–40,000 weapons, and only about 10,000 were
either handed in (8,500) or seized (1,500) during the 90 days, this means that at least 22,000–30,000
weapons are unaccounted for.
The question thus stays: what happened to the remaining weapons? Today, KLA no longer exists as
one single group: as noted in the introduction, some ex-KLA fighters have joined the KPC, the KPS,
politics, business, or organized crime, or have simply reintegrated themselves into civilian life. The
KLA weapons are thus likely to be in the control of various groups and individuals. According to
some analysts, some remaining weaponry is stored in Albania proper (Ripley, 2000, p. 22;
Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001, p. 20). It is possible that very large weapons stocks exist in
Albania, near its eastern border with Kosovo, around places such as Bucaj and Krumë, but these
weapons are beyond the scope of this report.44 They would be an important concern, however, should
armed clashes resume.
Larger weapons caches are still found throughout Kosovo, however, and some of the matériel is in a
condition that makes it likely that it has simply been forgotten. Others have not even been secured.45
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Cache seizure announcements appear almost daily in KFOR press releases. Thus, for example, a press
release of 7 March 2003 announced that soldiers from the Finnish and Norwegian battalions had
discovered a ‘significant’ cache in the Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje area, consisting of 32 hand
grenades, 13 rifles, 4,434 rounds of small arms ammunition, 400 grams of TNT, 1kg of plastic explosive,
38 weapon magazines, and 5 rifle grenades. The same day, lesser amounts of weapons and explosives
were also discovered in the vicinities of Vidomirovic, Ugdare, Mitrovica, and Podujevë/Podujevo
(KFOR, 2003).
Some of the KLA weapons were no doubt transferred to the UCPMB (a splinter group from the KLA
fighting Serb police in southern Serbia), which had approximately 2,200 members in 2000,46 when the
fighting in southern Serbia was at its peak. Today, the number of fighters is probably slightly lower,
perhaps around 1,000 (hence holding an estimated 1,600 to 2,000 weapons). The ethnic Albanian
NLA, which fought for ethnic separatism in FYROM in 2001, is also reported to be at least partially
based in Kosovo and reliant on havens around the territory. The total size of the NLA has been estimated
at approximately 1,500–2,000 active members in 2001.47 Again, using the active insurgent multiplier
of 1.6 weapons per combatant (see Box 4.1), as well as the higher figure of 2.0 weapons per combatant
based on the weapons proliferation in the region, the size of NLA stockpiles can be estimated at
2,400–4,000 SALW. Other KLA splinter groups, such as the Albanian National Army (Armata
Kombetare Shqiptare, AKSh), UCPG, and UCK-L together had an estimated 4,900 members in
2001,48 which means that a substantial part of ex-KLA weaponry, 7,800–9,800 weapons, could have
ended up in the hands of these groupings/organizations.
Together these calculations suggest that Kosovo Albanian militias, including the NLA, could hold
between 11,800 and 15,800 weapons, the figure offered in Table 4.1. The remaining former KLA
weapons, between 8,000 and 18,000 weapons, are assumed now to be part of civilian weapons
holdings.
Kosovo Serb paramilitary groups were quite strong in 1999. The ‘Black Hand’ had an estimated
700–1,000 members, the Serb Liberation Army (OSA) approximately 5,000, and the White Eagles
500–900 combatants.49 According to information obtained by SAS, these were well armed by the VJ
(the Yugoslav army) and Yugoslav police. This means that in 1999 the Kosovo Serb militias possessed
at least 1.6 x (700+5000+500) ≈ 9,900 weapons. More likely, the ratio of weapons to combatant was
higher, given the VJ’s ‘people’s war’ tactics.50 Using a multiplier of two weapons per combatant and the
higher number of militants yields a total of 13,800 SALW. Today, these militia groups have dwindled
to a handful of small groups operating mainly in Mitrovica, such as the Bridge Watchers. KFOR estimates
that these do not number more than a total of 150–200 men.51 While they do not carry guns openly
when ‘on duty’, Bridge Watchers have good access to arms. In clashes with UNMIK Police and KFOR,
they have used hand grenades and assault rifles (mainly Serbian-made AK-47s) (Paes and Matveeva,
2003, p. 40). If we use the same multiplier as above, the Bridge Watchers would have 240–400 arms.
Given the fact that they can rely on large swaths of volunteers (up to 5,000, according to some
sources), their total is most probably substantially higher. It is difficult to estimate what proportion of
the arms of the now-defunct militia groups still remain in Kosovo, as these militias were not indigenous
but pan-Serb paramilitaries. For counting purposes, however, we have assumed that these weapons
(with the exception of arms of the Bridge Watchers) are either part of the civilian stockpiles, or are
not in Kosovo proper.
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Box 4.1 Estimating weapons possession
Several of the figures in this chapter are precise and based on data made available to SAS. Some
numbers, however, such as the extent of civilian ownership, are not known and must hence be
estimated. SAS has previously developed techniques to estimate the number of guns in societies
or social groups. The main techniques are the ‘acquisition’ method and the ‘possession’ method.
The acquisition approach is based on the premise that an accurate picture of the number of guns in
a particular place at a particular time exists (say in 1990, when Yugoslavia started to unravel), and
that acquisitions by all parties after that date can be detailed. In Kosovo, this approach is rather
difficult to apply. Acquisitions by KLA, Kosovo Serb militias, and civilians are not well docu-
mented, to say the least. More importantly, there is no starting point (a point in time for which a
good approximation of the number of guns exists) from which to begin mapping acquisitions.
For these reasons, this report mainly uses the possession approach. This method estimates the
number of guns on the basis of the number of combatants, civilians, police, etc. and the multiplier
for gun-holding for each group. For example, if we know that there are 5,000 police in Kosovo,
and believe they hold on average 1.2 guns each, the total number of guns held by the police can
be estimated at 6,000.
How then are multipliers determined? Although the acquisition approach cannot easily be used
as an overall method in Kosovo, it comes into the picture when one determines how well armed
militias are, and hence the ratio of arms to combatants. This ratio is based on estimates of the
importance of inflows of weapons.
Another way of determining a multiplier is through extrapolation: if the number of arms per
police officer is known to be 1.2 in Canada, it can be assumed that the ratio is the same in other
comparable countries (Western democratic states). This method is used here for determining
militia holdings. From previous work, SAS has established an active militia multiplier of 1.6
weapon per combatant (Small Arms Survey, 2001). This number is used above.
A third way of determining the ratio is through surveys: people are asked how many guns they
own, and the ratio is then applied across the whole population. This method proved not to be
useful in Kosovo (see below).
Civilian holdings
Official data from federal Yugoslavia on firearms ownership in 1989 indicated that Kosovo, at the time,
had a total of 65,540 legally owned guns, or 4.1 per 100 residents (Gorjanc, 2000, Table 4). If
Kosovo followed the pattern of Yugoslavia as a whole, these licensed weapons consisted of pistols (56
per cent) and rifles (44 per cent) (calculated from Gorjanc, 2000, Table 2). This ratio of 4.1 guns per
100 inhabitants was the lowest average of all the regions of Yugoslavia,52 and is difficult to reconcile
with observed widespread public firearms ownership in the province. In the same year, the then
federal police estimated that more than 800,000 SALW were unregistered in Yugoslavia as a whole,
half of which (400,000) were reported to be possessed illegally in Kosovo (Gorjanc, 2000, p. 10).53 If
correct, this figure suggests that Kosovo Albanians may have been unwilling to register, or hindered
from registering, their guns in large numbers.
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It is hard to judge to what extent these statements represent political propaganda rather than truth.
What is clear is that during the increasing repression of the 1990s, Serb police and military also
cracked down on illegal weapons possession (see Box 6.1 for details). As these Yugoslav-era figures on reg-
istered and unregistered civilian possession of firearms are highly unreliable, it is necessary to resort to
other methods of estimating the number of guns among households in Kosovo.
One useful instrument is the so-called possession approach (see Box 4.1). This approach estimates the
number of guns on the basis of the number of combatants, police, or—in this case—civilians, and the
ratio of guns possessed by such groups.
In Kosovo, guns are kept as family possessions. Although controlled by the adult male members of the
household, they are ‘family guns’ rather than individually held. The basic unit for which possession is
estimated is therefore the household. In Kosovo, there are approximately 390,000 households.54 How
many of these households own guns, and how many guns do weapons-holding households possess on
average?
One way to answer these questions is through surveys. Respondents are asked whether they (or people
in their neighbourhood) own guns and, if so, how many. In Kosovo, this strategy proved unsuccessful.
When asked, ‘In your opinion, how many households in your neighbourhood have firearms’, 43 per
cent of all respondents answered that they did not know, and another six per cent refused to answer.
Refusal was extremely high (57 per cent) within the Kosovo Serb subset. Only a total of five per cent
believed that almost all, most, or every other household owned a gun.
At the same time, in answers to a more indirect question, 11 per cent of respondents believed that
there were too many guns in households. Moreover, almost half of respondents thought that there were
too many guns in society (compared with 20 per cent of Kosovo Albanians and 32 per cent of Kosovo
Serbs, who believed the opposite).55 These answers are a good indication of how sensitive the gun issue
is in Kosovo, and how widespread gun ownership is likely to be. They do not, however, help in generating
an accurate estimate of firearms possession.
Another method of estimating weapons possession is to examine the results of random searches under-
taken by KFOR.56 No such random searches are presently undertaken, and the results of those of 1999
and 2000 are not available.
Another route towards an assessment of the number of guns is the informed estimates of people
working in various branches of the security sector in Kosovo (Kosovans as well as international
personnel working for UNMIK and KFOR). In interviews, responses indicated that 60–70 per cent
of households own guns at present.57 While many households were perceived to possess one gun, a
fair share was believed to be in possession of two or more small arms (a mix of pistols, assault rifles,
and hunting weapons for the most part). On average, gun-owning households can be conservatively
estimated to own 1.4–1.7 guns. This yields an estimate of 330,000–460,000 weapons held by civilians
in Kosovo.
It is possible to get a picture of the most common types and makes of weapons by looking at those
weapons that have been collected and seized by UNMIK Police and, to a lesser extent, KFOR.58
According to police statistics, and as indicated in Figure 4.1, 44 per cent of all seizures are made up of
pistols, 20 per cent of assault rifles, 15 per cent of rifles, and 15 per cent of shotguns. The picture
gained from police seizures is somewhat different from the distribution of weapons seized by KFOR,
since the police do not primarily seize weapons from caches or other military-style holdings but from
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residential areas, cars, etc. Since the police data give a picture of guns seized in connection with crime
or suspected crime, including a range of non-violent and non-organized crimes like traffic offences,
they present a better reflection of general civilian holdings, and thus are relied upon here.
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Figure 4.1 SALW types seized by the police, 2000–2002
Figure 4.2  Assault rifle manufacturers
Police statistics also make it possible to analyse the distribution of makes of weapons seized (Figures 4.2
and 4.3). Assault rifles seized are primarily Kalashnikovs, with Zastavas coming a distant second. The
stocks of pistols held in Kosovo are more fragmented. Zastavas hold the largest share, with almost
40 per cent of all UNMIK police seizures of pistols. TTs (Tokarev) come second, while Berettas, CZs,
and Glocks together also account for a sizeable part of the stocks in the hands of Kosovo civilians. This
is important, because it shows that pistols are available from a wide variety of sources, perhaps indicating
the diffuse nature of weapons smuggling for civilian possession.
Given the relatively small size of Kosovo, the geographical distribution of SALW can in principle
shift rapidly. For this reason, some analysts believe that all parts of Kosovo, apart from Pristina (where
the international security presence is particularly dense), have similar levels of gun holdings among
civilians.
An analysis of the geographic distribution of UNMIK police seizures challenges this conventional
wisdom (Figure 4.4). Compared with population distribution, Gjilan/Gnjilane and Prizren are under-
represented in terms of weapons seized, while Mitrovica and Pejë/Pec´ are over-represented (Pristina
has almost equal shares of the total population and total SALW seizures). These figures should be
interpreted with some caution, as they depend in part on general crime levels, in addition to reflecting
levels of civilian possession of weapons.
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Figure 4.3  Pistol manufacturers
Are weapons more common in some social groups than others? As mentioned above, the male members
of households generally control weapons. Some more details about particularly well-armed groups can
be gleaned from the SABA household survey. Respondents to the survey who believed that there were
too many guns in society were asked as a follow-up question which parts of society had too many arms
(see Annex 1). Unsurprisingly, a majority believed that criminal groups were too well-armed. More
interestingly, 15 per cent of Kosovo Albanians thought that businessmen had too many guns (only one
per cent of ethnic Serbs thought so, however).59 Thirty-seven per cent of Kosovo Serb respondents and
12 per cent of Kosovo Albanians believed that there were too many guns among ex-fighters/ex-military.
Eight per cent of Kosovo Albanians believed that politicians had too many guns: political leaders
did not appear among Kosovo Serb responses.
The storage of household weapons has become increasingly sophisticated over time. Today, storage
inside houses often consists of purpose-built concealment. This increasing sophistication is a direct
response to KFOR search operations. More and more weapons are stored outside homes, buried in
gardens, or cached further afield. Consequently, there are fewer weapons in apartment blocks in the
cities than in individual homes in the countryside.
In the early days of KFOR/UNMIK seizures, it was quite common to find small arms in random vehicle
searches, which meant that weapons circulated rather extensively. Today, given the low return in
seizure operations, it appears that weapons are seldom moved, or that their means of transportation
have become more sophisticated. At present, less than one per cent of random vehicle searches result
in the seizure of weapons.60
Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin
Special Report Small Arms Survey 
Page 20
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
SALW seizures in region,
as % of total SALW seized
%
Bo
rde
r
Gn
jila
ne
Mi
tro
vic
a
Pe
c
Pr
ist
ina
Pr
izr
en
Regions
Region's population,
as % of total Kosovo population
Source: KPIS
Figure 4.4  Geographic distribution of police seizures, mid-2000 to end 2002
Box 4.2 Weapons in the political life of Kosovo
In contrast to general practice elsewhere in western and central Europe, politicians in Kosovo
do not depend on KPS or CIVPOL police for their private protection, but on private bodyguards.
After investigation, these bodyguards receive weapons authorization cards (WAC), (see Section
VI),61 which permit them to protect vulnerable political figures with weapons.
However, it is thought that, beyond official bodyguard weapons, the political parties in Kosovo
are well-armed. According to interviewees working on security issues, all ethnic Serb parties are
‘fully equipped’ and would even admit this publicly in Mitrovica. Kosovo Albanian parties most
probably also have guns at their disposal.
According to UNMIK statistics covering the period July 2000–December 2001, 155 reported
criminal incidents involved political parties, either as victims or as perpetrators. Nine of these
concerned illegal weapons possession, 20 were shooting incidents, and another 14 cases concerned
grenade attacks. The illegal weapons possession cases seem to indicate that guns are not absent
from Kosovan political parties. Moreover, the fact that more than 20 per cent of all reported
criminal incidents involved weapons-related violence (shooting and grenade attacks)62 means
that political life has been rather violent in Kosovo. It is important to note, however, that election-
related violence has been very limited and decreasing from year to year.63
Weapons collection efforts after official demobilization
Since the end of the war in June 1999, both UNMIK Police and KFOR have attempted to mop up
illegal weapons through searches and amnesties.64 There have been two amnesties, from 1 May to
3 June 2001 and from 15 March to 15 April 2002. The amnesties have been organized jointly by
KFOR and UNMIK. They have permitted people to hand back weapons anonymously either to the
police or to KFOR, and special hand-in points have been designated for that purpose. During the
second amnesty, more than 80 per cent of the weapons were collected by KFOR, which had better
organizational means and resources to implement the amnesty. In addition to the weapons handed in,
the authorities noted that there were more ‘casual findings’ of weapons during the period of the
amnesty. This appears to indicate that people who did not trust the authorities’ promise of anonymity
left guns in areas where KFOR or UNMIK Police would probably find them. This also suggests that
the number of weapons collected during the amnesties, listed in Table 4.3, underestimates the total
yields of the amnesty.
Kosovo and the Gun
Small Arms Survey    Special Report
Page 21
Perceived shortcomings of the amnesties have included lack of information and communication on
the part of the authorities before the starting date, their short time period, and overly visible collec-
tion points (which make people shy away from handing in weapons). In this regard, the second
amnesty is considered to have been more successful than the first. For instance, in conjunction with
the 2002 amnesty, American and Russian KFOR troops worked together on publicising the measures,
going from village to village with megaphones.65
Amnesty results have been less successful among the minority Kosovo Serb communities than in the
Kosovo Albanian ones. One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly that Kosovo Serbs continue to feel
that they have to protect themselves. In the SABA household survey, 27 per cent of Kosovo Serb
respondents and only four per cent of Kosovo Albanian interviewees said that they thought people
kept firearms for purposes of ensuring ‘political security’ (see Section VI for details).
Support from Kosovan political leaders for the amnesties has been limited. Endorsement has been
more widespread at the Kosovo-wide level (with political personalities such as President Rugova,
Prime Minister Rexhepi, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj, and PDK’s Hacim Thaçi expressing their
support for weapons collection during the 2002 campaign) than at the municipal level. There were
some notable exceptions to the latter, however. Halil Morina, chief executive of Suharekë/Suva Reka
municipality, stated the day before the second amnesty started, ‘We do not need weapons, we must get
back to work, prosperity and future, to create a free and secure society’ (cited in KFOR, 2002, p. 12).
So far, Kosovo Serb political leaders have not been supporting weapons collection efforts.
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2001 amnesty 2002 amnesty
Weapons type TOTAL 2001 KFOR 2002 UNMIK Police TOTAL
2002 2002
Rifles 400 (approx.) 393 24 417
Pistols 65 74 1 75
Machine guns 22 2 24
Mortars 0 1 0 1
Anti-tank 21 43 2 45
Rockets/ Missiles 16 7 2 9
Grenades 200 (approx.)* 658 68 726
Mines 51 43 94
Ammunition 31,000 (approx.) 58771 429 59200
Misc. items** 75 759 136 895
Total (excluding 777 1,249 142 1391 
ammunition and 
misc.)
Table 4.3. Results of weapons amnesties in 2001 and 2002
*In 2001, grenades and mines were reported together in one category.
**‘Miscellaneous items’ include uniforms, masks, and (in 2001) 75 uncategorized support weapons.
Sources: KFOR (2001; 2002b); UNMIK (2001)
The media coverage of the amnesties shows that the international authorities have been the main
driving force in promoting the amnesty. Of the 109 press reports from the Kosovo media outlets
included in the Weapon Amnesty Media Summary (KFOR, 2002a), 38 contain a reference to national
authorities, while 85 refer to international bodies and/or personalities.66 The summary also shows that
domestic authorities, such as the government and the KPC, preferred written statements to personal
appeals or direct appearances in the press. They were rather passive in the early stages of the amnesty,
but became more active supporters towards the end of the amnesty period.
Amnesties and seizure operations have at times worked in tandem. Perhaps unsurprisingly, amnesties
have brought in relatively more weapons than searches of houses and cars (see Figure 4.5). In certain
parts of Kosovo, searches were intensified in the months before the second amnesty in order to make
the population more inclined to give up their guns.67
Seizure operations by KFOR have been ongoing since the end of the conflict and are a more or less
constant feature of the soldiers’ work. From January 2001 to 12 March 2003, KFOR troops seized a total
of almost 3,000 rifles, 900 pistols, 56 machine guns, 63 mortars, 450 anti-tank weapons, 74 rockets,
2,200 grenades, and a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition (see Figure 4.6 and Table 4.4).
UNMIK Police, in contrast, mainly collect guns in connection with law enforcement operations, such
as house searches that are part of criminal investigations (these seizures are discussed above).
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Figure 4.5  Comparison of the yields of KFOR seizure operations and
weapons amnesty, 15 March–15 April 2002
According to interviews with representatives of both the international community and Kosovans, current
weapons seizure programmes are not perceived negatively by the general population. Naturally, there are
exceptions, such as the roadblocks in the Drenica area in the year 2000, where people protested against
what they saw as mainly ex-KLA targeted seizures.68 In general, however, and despite difficult past
experiences with weapons seizures,69 current efforts to collect military-style weapons are met calmly, as
the population is aware that the weapons seized will not be used against them. This is less true for seizures
of hunting rifles, which have met with fierce resistance. The collected weapons are currently destroyed
locally at a metal welding factory in Janjevo, to the south-east of Pristina. This is also true for those
weapons confiscated by the police. To date, a total of 18,000 weapons have been destroyed.
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Multinational Rifles Pistols Machine Mortars ATs Rockets Grenades Mines Ammunition Misc. 
brigade guns
(MNB)
MNB Central 51 11 2 0 0 0 138 3 10610 224
MNB East 5 2 2 0 6 4 3 1 852 1
MNB 43 10 1 0 1 0 35 1 7120 155
North-East
MNB 59 13 5 1 5 5 32 76 5388 616
South-West
MSU 11 12 4 0 0 3 18 0 3895 64
Total 169 48 14 1 12 12 226 81 27865 1060
Table 4.4. Weapons seized by KFOR, 1 January-12 March 2003
Source: KFOR
Figure 4.6  Weapons seized by KFOR troops in 2001 and 2002
Box 4.3   The legacy of March 1997
A unique exogenous factor shaping small arms stockpiles in Kosovo was the sudden pillaging of
over half a million small arms from state arsenals in neighbouring Albania. There are different
figures for the number of weapons lost in March 1997. Early reports from UN sources put the
total at 643,220 SALW. The more commonly used Albanian police figures stand at 549,775
weapons. The discrepancy between the two numbers—almost a hundred thousand weapons—
which has not yet been analysed, let alone resolved, is so large in itself that it alone could easily
wreak great havoc.
A series of Albanian and internationally sponsored projects subsequently recovered a significant
proportion of this equipment from the people of Albania. Numbers range from a total of 103,344
weapons according to the most detailed sources used in Table 4.5, to 200,000 according to others.70
As shown in Table 4.3, however, the largest proportions recovered were among those categories
least suitable for guerrilla warfare, such as old-fashioned bolt-action rifles and heavier items like
grenade launchers, mortars, and medium-sized machine guns. Pistols and automatic rifles, how-
ever, were much less likely to be turned in. These relative successes aside, a significant proportion
of the lost weaponry remains unaccounted for.
There is currently no way to establish the proportion of these weapons that was transferred out
of Albania. Some undoubtedly drifted into the international black market. Others fell into the
hands of Kosovo Albanians and Macedonians. While the numbers are unknown, it is almost
certainly no coincidence that KLA’s challenge to Serbian authority in Kosovo accelerated rapidly
after March 1997. The conventional wisdom maintains that something like 150,000 of these
weapons reached Kosovo Albanian combatants (and, presumably, civilians) in Kosovo and
FYROM, but this is just an educated guess (for example, see Kanani, 2002). If it were true, however,
estimates of the total number of KLA force arsenals would have to be increased substantially
(see Section IV).
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Type Lost Recovered % Recovered
Pistols 38,000 170 0.4
AK-47 226,000 17,522 7.7
Bolt rifles 351,000 66,995 19.0
Machine guns 25,000 11,643  46.0
Grenade launchers 2,450 792 32.0
Mortars 770 242 31
Total 643,220 97,364 15
Table 4.5. Lost and found: Weapons pillaged and recovered in Albania, 
March 1997-September 2001
Note: The Gramsh Pilot Program recovered another 5,980 weapons of unspecified type.
On the Gramsh Pilot Programme see  UNDP (2001). 
Source: Small Arms Survey (2002,  p. 299)
Black-market weapons prices
Although not always easy to analyse, weapons prices can give valuable information about the supply
of and demand for weapons. In Kosovo, in general, Yugoslav-made weapons are more popular than the
Chinese-made pistols and AK-47s coming from Albania. The Yugoslav makes are of better quality and
are hence more expensive on the black market. Prices for Albanian-sourced AK-47s were around EUR
150–200 in the first quarter of 2003, while Yugoslav-made AK-47s fetched EUR 250–400 (a price
which could go as high as EUR 550 for new ones).71 7.62 mm pistols of Albanian origin were, during
the same time period, priced at EUR 300–350, while those of Yugoslav origin fetched around EUR
400. A range of other weapons is also available on the black market.
Prices are also not uniform throughout Kosovo. In the central and eastern parts of the territory,
prices are generally higher than those near the western borders, with a differential of EUR 50–100
for most major weapons types.72 Prices on the black market in Albania are still lower than in Kosovo,
with 9mm pistols going for EUR 700–1,000 in Kosovo and EUR 400–500 in Albania (rifles would
go from EUR 350–600 in Kosovo and EUR 200–250 in Albania). This is consistent with the price
difference between western border areas and the rest of the territory of Kosovo. It is also unsurprising,
given that the majority of the weapons looted in 1997 in Albania have not yet been recovered (see
Box 4.3).
Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin
Special Report Small Arms Survey 
Page 26
V. Gun smuggling across the borders of Kosovo
Introduction
The Balkans, and the former Yugoslavia in particular, are often viewed as the predominant source of
Europe’s illegal gun trade, especially for small shipments destined for organized crime groups. Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo are routinely grouped together as the
centre of the problem (Sagramoso, 2001, p. 48; Paes and Matveeva, 2003, p. 50). However, the research
conducted for this report suggests that gun smuggling is not a major activity on the Kosovo borders,
compared both with other types of smuggling and with gun smuggling in the region generally.
This is not because such trade would be impossible or even difficult. The international military and
police presence notwithstanding, the borders of Kosovo are porous. This applies both to the interna-
tional borders with Albania and FYROM, and to the so-called administrative boundary-line (ABL)
with Serbia and Montenegro. It is also equally true for the international border crossings and ABL
checkpoints on the one hand, and the ‘green border’ (the border/boundary-line stretches between
official border crossings/checkpoints) on the other. Obviously, organized and unorganized crime takes
advantage of this fact, and smuggling and contraband are rife.73
However, although there is certainly an illicit trans-border trade in SALW, it is rather minor—amounting
to tens and occasionally hundreds of guns—when compared with the illegal trafficking of human
beings, cigarettes, and fuel.74 Given that Kosovo is already well-stocked with arms, demand is tied
primarily to criminal and extremist political groupings. Such groups regularly replace and upgrade
their equipment. Given that the market for arms is relatively saturated, trafficking in humans, cigarettes,
and fuel is also both less risky, and, most importantly, more profitable. The limited larger-scale smuggling
in guns (involving lorry-loads) that does exist is mostly thought to consist of (illicit) transhipments
along the so-called Balkan route.75
Border control arrangements
Although the border control arrangements around Kosovo are rather complex, and remain entirely
under UNMIK and KFOR command, they do not ensure that borders are entirely guarded. One of the
interviewees referred to the boundaries as a ‘Swiss cheese’, and some of the institutional arrangements
of the borders make smuggling easier.
At the international border crossings, the UNMIK border police are responsible for the passage of
persons, while the UNMIK Customs Service is in charge of controlling vehicles. The UNMIK border
police involve both CIVPOL police officers and members of the local KPS. The UNMIK Customs
service is led by internationals, but the people on the ground are Kosovans.76 Today, the arrangements
are the same for checkpoints along the administrative boundary-line as for international border
crossings.77 The location of both international crossing points and ABL checkpoints largely depends
on topography: they can be anything from a few hundred metres to several kilometres from the Serb,
Montenegrin, Macedonian, or Albanian checkpoints/international crossings.
A peculiarity of the administrative boundary line with Serbia and Montenegro is that it is surrounded
by a 5km so-called ‘ground safety zone’, where the police and military role is limited to a boundary-line
control function (in the form of checkpoints). In other words, this is, in many ways, a stretch of land
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that is uncontrolled and that is frequently used by smugglers and those stashing weapons. Interviewees
report that at night, there is substantial movement on many stretches of this no-man’s land, and small
arms caches of weapons are fairly common.
The green border (both between international crossing points and between ABL checkpoints) is
controlled by KFOR, in accordance with the territorial divisions of Kosovo into five sectors. The
northern borderline with Serbia is French-controlled, the north-eastern stretch is a British responsibility,
the south-eastern border, towards both Serbia and FYROM, is under American supervision, while the
whole of the western frontier is under German and Italian command.
Smuggling at border checkpoints
The UNMIK Customs Service, operational since 1999, has one primary objective: revenue collection.
Duties and taxes collected on imports at the border account for a significant percentage of the total
revenues collected in Kosovo. In accordance with this, the customs service concentrates on freight
movements and on reducing contraband (mainly of cigarettes and fuel). Until 2002, it had no ‘protection
of society’ mandate that could be used to interdict drugs, unauthorized pharmaceuticals, arms, etc.
entering into the territory. This was the task of the border police, notwithstanding the fact that the
police do not, as a general rule, check vehicles, but only persons. As a result, there is at present no
concerted and effective effort to stem small arms trafficking at the border crossings, although this is
about to change.78 However, the fact that the international authorities have proscribed transhipment
of goods through Kosovo makes more large-scale and region-wide trafficking attempts less attractive
to organized crime groups, which often have other supply routes.
Although it has no ‘protection of society’ mandate, when checking cargo the customs service has at
times made seizures of guns. These seizures are of two main types: larger seizures of arms hidden in trucks,
and small seizures of one or a few guns stashed in cars.79 Whenever a weapon is found by customs, it is
handed over to the border police. The border police themselves also make a certain number of seizures.
Comparatively speaking, the number of combined customs and border police seizures is very low. As
indicated in Figure 4.4, only 37 SALW seizures, or 0.8 per cent of all law-enforcement seizures of guns
from mid-2000 to the end of 2002, have taken place at the border. An additional problem is that even
these few seizures are not necessarily always well investigated, as the border police do not have the
capacity to conduct post-seizure investigations.80
These low numbers for weapons seizures must be interpreted with caution, since they reflect not only
the rather modest levels of SALW smuggling across the borders of Kosovo, but also the fact that the
customs has no technical equipment such as X-ray machines with which to examine loads passing
through the border.81 Moreover, customs has little manpower, and customs officials, like other profes-
sionals in Kosovo, are poorly paid. Hence, the temptation to accept bribes can be great, and corruption
is a major concern. This problem is recognized by the customs authority, which has established a reward
scheme to counter bribery attempts. Under this scheme, a customs team that finds an illegal weapons
shipment is awarded a sum which depends on the size of the seizure, but which can be substantially
larger than the monthly salary.82 Such measures notwithstanding, weapons smuggled in cars and trucks
can probably pass the Kosovo borders at any time.
Customs is not entitled to check all cargo: those of humanitarian organization and KFOR contractors
are exempt from customs clearance. There have been alleged cases when members of certain less well-
paid contingents have escorted civilian cars filled with cigarettes and money up to the border to avoid
customs control. No soldier has been caught smuggling arms, however.83
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Map of Kosovo (smuggling routes)
Smuggling routes, the green border, and internal trade
Smuggling of SALW across the green border is common but not particularly large-scale. Traffickers
over the green border use the same methods as were used during the war. Smuggling is thus often con-
ducted with mules, which are either led by persons or, more often, cross the border unaccompanied. A
mule will normally carry 20–30 guns with each crossing. The mule trade is common in the mountainous
areas of Kosovo.
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Once the mules have crossed the border, their loads are transferred to more modern means of locomotion,
especially trucks or prepared vans, in which they are then transported across Kosovo. As a result of its
anti-smuggling operations, KFOR has at times been in charge of as many as 30–40 mules confiscated
for smuggling, a situation that is not without practical difficulties.84
In Kosovo, weapons enter primarily from the west and the north, and exit mainly towards the south
and east. Weapons are smuggled in from Serbia and Montenegro (where sought-after, high-quality
guns—mainly, but not uniquely, of Yugoslav make—are sourced) and from Albania, which is the
principal source of cheaper, Chinese-made weapons. The guns from Serbia and particularly those from
Montenegro often come from further afield: Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a common source ever
since the war (many Bosniaks were sympathetic to the KLA, and Bosnia and Herzegovina has an
important SALW industry).85 Weapons exit Kosovo mainly for FYROM, where they are sought after by
ethnic separatists and criminal elements, but also for southern Serbia and further afield. The interdiction
of transhipment notwithstanding, there is a certain illicit transit trade through Kosovo.
The main routes are the same as for smuggling in other types of goods. In general, guns are transported
along the major highways. A major inflow-hub is Pejë/Pec´. Another transit route is through the south-
ernmost tip of Kosovo, from Albania via Dragash/Dragasˇ to Tetovo in FYROM.
Smuggling in arms, as in other commodities (as well as in humans), tends to be an organized activity.
However, it is not clear whether, or to what extent, weapons smuggling is linked to other forms of
smuggling. Most, although not all, interviewees working in the security sector stressed that trafficking
is organized geographically: a family/clan controls one area of Kosovo, including all forms of smuggling
within or across that region. This would imply that illicit trafficking networks are linked, at least
within Kosovo.
Places where weapons are bought internally include coffee shops and markets across Kosovo.86 Personal
and sometimes family contacts are important in getting in touch with sellers.87 Even without such
contacts, it is not difficult to get hold of a weapon, however. It is possible to place orders with particular
traders for a special weapon model, including Western makes, which is then purchased abroad and taken
across the Kosovo border specifically for the customer in question.
It is widely alleged that soldiers of certain contingents stationed in Kosovo, whose pay rates are low,
are involved in various smuggling activities, especially trafficking in fuel. However, gun smuggling,
precisely because of its relatively low profitability, is not thought to be among them.88 In contrast, it is
alleged that German KFOR soldiers were involved in one highly publicized arms smuggling incident.
Small arms collected in Prizren were smuggled to FYROM and then to Darmstadt in Germany (Davis,
2002, p. 57).
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VI. Gun culture and weapons regulations, past and present
Kosovo Albanian gun culture: ‘A house without a weapon is not a home’
As in many other parts of the world, guns have become part of the fabric of Kosovan culture. Among
international personnel serving in Kosovo, references to Albanian gun culture and, specifically, to the
Kanun are common in explaining Kosovo Albanians’ (mis)usage of and attachment to the gun. The
Kanun is the customary law that, in the absence of an effective government, regulated social life in
northern Albania and Kosovo for many centuries. Some of the laws allegedly date back to the Illyrians,
whom ethnic Albanians consider as their ancestors. The written code was put on paper in the fifteenth
century by Lekë Dukagjini: hence the name Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit.
The Kanun contains numerous references to guns, and represents an elaborate socio-legal code regulating
the use of firearms. The gun figures prominently as a form of protection and as a means of meting out
justice. If a person murders a priest, for example, it is specified in the Kanun that he shall be executed
‘by a firing squad’ (para. 17).89 Much of the legislation pertaining to murder presumes that the murder
is committed—and will be avenged—by the gun. Other crimes such as adultery are also dealt with
through recourse to the gun. According to the Kanun, if a man finds his wife with another man, he
can kill them both. If he uses a single bullet, no blood feud ensues (para. 923). In the words of the
Kanun, ‘The parents of the adulterous pair may not seek vengeance, but must give the murderer a new
cartridge with the words “Blessed be your hand”’ (para. 924). However, guns have traditionally not
been intended for public display. Weapons, according to Albanian tradition, should not be visible, and
the bearer of the weapon should not be proud of it. If the bearer ignored these rules, the sanctions would
be severe (Hasani, 2003).
However, the role of such social codes and rules in regulating contemporary life is often over-
stated, and the extent to which such ancient codes influence behaviour is questionable. Kanun
rules on restraint in the use of force and the display of weapons have been slowly eroding, for
example. Adherence to the injunctions of the Kanun (in all areas of life) has also weakened with
migration from the rural to urban areas, and seems to have lost much of its force in Kosovo as the
rule of law is strengthened. Attitudes towards guns and gun culture seem to cleave as well along a
generational divide, with especially young urban dwellers being potentially anti-gun, perceiving
guns as a thing of the past or as a ‘peasant thing’. The refugee experience has also turned some
youth against guns.
The more general status conferred by the gun, and especially military guns, has not diminished
substantially, but this can be attributed to the prominence of the KLA and the role of weapons in
criminal activities. Overall, the pressures of modernization, including under decades of Communist
rule, mean that the Kanun, at least as far as guns are concerned, provides more background colour
and a justification for social behaviour than a rigorous set of rules that actually governs social life in
Kosovo today.90
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Box 6.1 The history of weapons collection in Kosovo
Organized weapons collection programmes have a long and difficult history in Kosovo.
Seizures date back at least to the Ottomans. In 1844, as part of a modernizing reform package,
the authorities in Istanbul started to strengthen their control over previously quite remotely
governed regions like Kosovo. These new measures also included attempts to disarm the local
population. As the modernizing reform was strongly resisted in conservative Kosovo throughout
the following decades, more guns were confiscated in successive campaigns to keep the population
under control. One of the reasons that the revolutionary so-called Young Turks received the
support of conservative Albanians in Kosovo, in their attempts to wrestle the power from the old
guard in power in Istanbul, was that they promised to respect the Albanians’ traditional rights,
including the right to carry arms.
In the first decade of the twentieth century, people in Kosovo again rebelled against the
Ottomans, this time because of new taxes. To quell the resistance, Ottoman troops were sent to
Pejë/Pec´ and Gjakovë/–Dakovica, where taxes were forcefully collected, the population registered,
and arms confiscated. For example, in 1910, as many as 147,525 guns were allegedly confiscated
through harsh means. In the same move, all knives other than bread-knives were banned.
During the first half of the twentieth century, when Albanians were under Serb/Yugoslav rule,
the Serbian gendarmerie conducted what it called disarmament expeditions, but which in fact
amounted to ethnically-based systematic violence against the Albanians. In the early post-Second
World War period the federal Yugoslav police, under Minister of Interior Aleksander Rankovic´,
attempted to collect arms forcibly from the population. In the winter of 1956, these house-to-
house seizure programmes led to beatings, torture, and even killings. According to Noel Malcolm,
‘so severe was the treatment of those who failed to hand over a gun that many Albanians would
prudently buy a weapon in order to have something to surrender’ (1998, pp. 320–21).
As the Yugoslav federation was dismembered in the 1990s, Milosevic continued the tradition
of violent weapons collection. Kosovo Albanians were beaten, tortured, or wrongfully fined in
weapons seizure operations.
Sources: Malcolm (1998); Jansen (2002)
Attitudes towards guns in present-day Kosovo
While it is difficult to accurately depict Kosovans’ perceptions of small arms, findings from the SABA
household survey suggest that Kosovans are not as attached to their guns as commonly believed. When
asked whether there were too many guns in society, 47 per cent of the survey respondents answered
‘yes’, and only 21 per cent said ‘no’ (with the remaining percentage choosing ‘don’t know’: see Annex
1). Similarly, over 50 per cent of respondents thought it likely or somewhat likely that people in their
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neighbourhood would hand in their guns in exchange for investments in their community (Annex 1).
Lastly, 54 per cent of respondents claimed they would not choose to own a gun even if it were legal
(Annex 1). These findings suggest that gun possession patterns among Kosovans are not as inflexible
or culturally conditioned as previously believed.
Nevertheless, and as shown in previous sections, Kosovo remains a heavily armed society. Survey findings
suggest that there are two main motives that explain gun possession in Kosovo: personal security and
protection, and activities such as hunting (see Annex 1 for details). While both the ethnic Albanian
and the ethnic Serb communities seem to agree that hunting is a legitimate reason for holding a gun,
there are some revealing differences regarding the two groups’ perceptions of security and protection.
Kosovo Albanians tend to see crime as the main threat to their security: 70 per cent of them think
there are too many guns in the hands of criminal groups. They also feel that the security situation in
Kosovo is improving, and have great trust in current security institutions, especially the KPS. Ethnic
Albanians are relatively comfortable with current state institutions, and insecurity is more associated
with crime than with institutions.
While Kosovo Serbs also justify gun ownership in terms of ensuring personal and family security, they
seem much more concerned about political factors than their Kosovo Albanian counterparts. 31 per
cent of Kosovo Serbs said they would choose to own a firearm for ‘political’ reasons, as against four per
cent of Kosovo Albanian respondents. Even though they remain sensitive to the number of guns in
the hands of criminals, they are much more concerned than Kosovo Albanians by weapons in the hands
of ex-combatants and in society as a whole. This reflects their discontent with the current political
situation and distrust in current security providers: ethnic Serbs would prefer having Serbian authorities
and local militias enforce security and do not believe the security situation is improving. Finally, ethnic
Serbs are much less enthusiastic than ethnic Albanians about the likelihood of people handing in guns
in exchange for community investments.
These findings suggest that Kosovans’ perception of guns greatly depends on their level of satisfaction
with the current political situation. Kosovo Albanians are comfortable with the current security and
political situation and therefore see tradition and protection against criminality as the main motives
behind gun possession. Ethnic Serbs, on the other hand, are much less in agreement with current
institutional arrangements and give political insecurity much greater weight in terms of justifying gun
possession.
Box 6.2  Celebratory fire
Celebratory fire is quite common in Kosovo and a normal ingredient in celebrations, such as
weddings and New Year festivities. Against this, no police action is normally taken, although it
depends somewhat on the nationality of the UNMIK police officers in charge. Generally, the
international authorities will intervene only if members of the KPS or the KPC are involved in
the shooting. Such members of security forces normally face disciplinary action.
There are no statistics on injuries arising from celebratory fire in Kosovo. However, the severity
of such injuries should not be underestimated.
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Gun laws in Kosovo
UNMIK is currently attempting to re-create a legislative framework for the possession and transfer of
small arms in Kosovo. So far, re-regulation is only partial. Hence, in some sectors, such as that of
imports and exports, as well as production of SALW, no post-Yugoslav laws or regulations exist.
In contrast, civilian possession has been re-regulated with UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/7 on the
Authorisation of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo. According to this law, persons in need of special
protection may get permission to hold a so-called weapon authorization card (WAC), which allows
them to acquire and carry a weapon at all times.91 Only ‘vulnerable persons’, i.e. persons who, according
to police reports and security assessments, are facing serious threats, may acquire a WAC. The so-
called Threat Assessment Committee established by the UNMIK police commissioner assesses every
WAC application. The WAC may be given directly to the vulnerable person or more often to his or
her registered bodyguard.
UNMIK Police has issued such permits very restrictively. On average, fewer than ten per cent of appli-
cations are accepted, mainly from individuals facing specific threats, including leading figures of the
main political parties. The heaviest authorized weapons are AK-47s.
Other types of weapons, excluding hunting and recreational weapons, are illegal under Regulation 2001/7.
The punishment for illicit weapons holding is very severe: a maximum of eight years’ imprisonment,
a fine of up to EUR 7,500, or both.92 In practice, however, prosecution for this type of crime has been
relatively rare.
Hunting and recreational weapons have also recently been re-regulated. Hunters and recreational
shooters could, between 1 February and 1 May 2003, register their hunting/recreational weapons 93
at their local police stations without facing prosecution. Owners may register as many guns of the
permitted types as they wish. After the grace period ended on 1 May, owners of hunting or recre-
ational weapons could still register their guns. However, if found unregistered, the weapons will be
seized by UNMIK Police and/or KFOR, and the owners may be faced with a criminal charge. Upon
registration, applicants receive a Weapon Registration Card that is valid for two years. As of 1 May
2003, more than 20,000 guns had been registered.94 The number of organized hunters is a little less
than 9,000.95
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VII. Direct and indirect effects of guns in Kosovo
Introduction
The widespread availability of guns has had a number of consequences for Kosovo society, even in the
years since the end of the war. The direct effects include fatal and non-fatal injuries, as well as psycho-
logical and physical disabilities due to small arms misuse. In this section, only fatal and non-fatal
injuries are discussed, since no data is available on psychological or physical disabilities. The indirect
effects are more numerous—including social, economic, and human development dimensions—and
sometimes more difficult to quantify. In this section, two indirect effects of gun use are examined in
more detail. These are guns in crime and guns in the school environment. From the short overview in
this section, it seems clear that guns have had a differentiated impact on society, affecting, for example,
crime more than the school environment.
Fatal and non-fatal injuries
In 2002, firearm injuries resulted in 98 hospital visits throughout Kosovo, down from 125 in
2001(for details, see Figure 7.1).96 The figures are substantially lower than for the immediate post-war
period: in the six-month period from June to December 1999 alone, 100 firearms injuries were reported
by Pristina University Hospital, which is the main referral hospital for traumatic injuries in Kosovo.
The above figures are most likely lower than the actual number of firearms injuries. The catchment
area of the Pristina University Hospital is Kosovo-wide. However, some other large clinics elsewhere
in the territory also treat injuries. Ethnic Serbs most often prefer to receive treatment for their injuries
in Mitrovica (or, if they live in enclaves in the south-east, at camp Bondsteel, the US multinational
brigade headquarters). This is reflected in the above statistics, as there are no reported cases with
patients from Zubin Potok, Zveqan/Zvecˇane, or Novobërdë/Novo Brdo (see Table 7.1 in Annex 5).
The total number of injuries is hence most likely higher than that reflected in the statistics from the
Pristina University Hospital. It is also well-established that not all injuries due to violence come under
hospital care, especially if the injuries are the result of criminal dealings. This also serves to depress
injury figures. The figures do, however, capture the declining trend in firearms injuries.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare these figures with pre-war figures. As for other statistical
data (such as on crime), the injury data was either brought to Belgrade by ethnic Serbs fleeing Kosovo,
or destroyed in the course of the war.
Knife injuries and beatings are difficult to interpret and compare with firearms injuries, mainly because
many such injuries were treated locally, especially in 1999. It seems, however, that there is a trend
towards a larger proportion of non-gun related injuries in Kosovo. For comparison, it should be noted
that injuries caused by intentional violence are dwarfed by another source of injury: traffic accidents.
In June–December 1999, traffic injuries resulted in a total of 1,361 hospital visits. In 2001, the figure
was 1,230; in 2002, it was 1,883.97
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Guns in crime
As discussed in more detail in Section III, violent crime is not particularly high in Kosovo.98 Reported
homicide, robbery, and assault levels are similar to, or lower than, those of other countries in the region.
As a consequence, people in Kosovo are also feeling increasingly secure.
However, in the crimes that are committed in Kosovo guns are prevalent. The Kosovo Police
Information System, a database established by UNMIK Police covering all reported crimes committed
on the territory, gives detailed information on the extent of gun use in crime. Of 76 reported homicides
in 2002, 55 (72 per cent) were committed with firearms. In contrast, only seven out of the 55 reported
kidnapping cases (13 per cent) of the same year involved guns (see Table 7.2 below). Robberies and
aggravated assaults come in between, with approximately 31 per cent and 22 per cent respectively
committed with firearms.
Kosovo has high gun-crime rates when compared with other countries. For comparison, Table 7.2
presents the ratio of homicides and robbery committed with firearms in two other selected countries.
In Estonia and Hungary, two other post-Communist states, the firearm homicide rates were 13 per cent
and 11 per cent respectively. Kosovo’s high percentage of homicides committed with guns makes it
less probable that guns simply replace other types of weapons/tools for committing murder (what in
criminology is called the substitution effect). Although this is somewhat speculative, it seems that the
widespread availability of guns in itself may have increased the number of homicides in Kosovo.
Details of the homicide cases seem to corroborate this, as some have an accidental component to
them, or are a result of a suspect’s access to a gun as an argument erupted (UNMIK Police Briefing Notes,
various issues).
Also in the case of robberies, Kosovo is somewhat anomalous in comparison with Estonia and
Hungary. Robberies are twice as likely to be committed with firearms in Kosovo as they are in Estonia,
and four times more likely than in Hungary. The fact that guns are used less often in kidnapping seems
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Figure 7.1  Hospital reporting on reasons for visit/injury
to be related to the fact that a large number of kidnappings in Kosovo are related to intra-family conflicts
or inter-family feuds. This, in turn, seems to indicate that guns, although widely available, are not used
indiscriminately.
Data on the types of firearms used in acts of violence is much more sketchy, as the make or type is only
rarely indicated.99 From what has been indicated, it can be tentatively deduced that AK-47s and
pistols dominate among the known weapons types used in murders, kidnappings, robberies, and
aggravated assault.
This is also confirmed by the focus group discussions conducted for this study. In all these discussions,
pistols and automatic weapons (together with knives) were ranked as the three most dangerous
weapons. Given that pistols and automatic weapons, in conjunction with hunting rifles, are the most
common guns among civilians in Kosovo, this is not surprising. It has implications for weapons
collection and control efforts, however. Any efforts to collect guns could usefully focus on those
most predominantly associated with violence. Hence, it seems that AK-47s and pistols, rather
than hunting rifles or other types of guns, should receive more attention in the UNDP/ISAC
WED pilot in 2003.
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Figure 7.2  Percentage of reported crimes committed with SALW, 
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Figure 7.3 Types of SALW used in murders, 2002
Figure 7.4 Types of SALW used in kidnappings, 2002
Figure 7.5 Types of SALW used in robberies, 2002
Gun-free environments? Guns and schools
According to a survey undertaken by the International Rescue Committee and the UNDP, the prolif-
eration of weapons in society was among the top ten concerns of youth in Kosovo in 2001, and among
the top five concerns among ethnic Albanians (IRC and UNDP, 2001, p. 6, pp. 55–56). A year earlier,
the UNDP had held a series of workshop-style discussions with youth groups in Kosovo to elicit their
perceptions of the scale of the small arms problem. During these discussions, youth consistently stated
that approximately 25–50 per cent of them could personally and easily acquire a firearm within 24
hours (UNDP, 2000). The young people participating in the discussions believed that between five and
20 per cent of all students were armed or claimed that they were armed at school. This number was
not the same across schools: it was lower in more specialized secondary schools (medicine, economics,
etc.) than in the larger ‘gymnasiums’. At that time, the discussions revealed that youth did not feel
secure in schools. Security provisions within schools were poor. Most problematic were youth from
outside the school that came into the school grounds to threaten those within. Often, young women
were assaulted.
By early 2003, the situation had changed in some ways, but remained the same in others. For this research
report, the Kosovo Initiative for a Democratic Society (KIDS) was commissioned by the UNDP and
UNICEF to undertake research in schools around Kosovo, both urban/rural and minority/majority
establishments, in order to investigate the issue of violence and gun use. Personnel from fifteen
schools, eight primary and seven secondary schools were interviewed by a former teacher on violence
in general and the use of arms in particular.100 This research shows that the situation has in certain
respects evolved somewhat since 2000. It leaves open other issues, to be elucidated through further
study, mainly as a consequence of teachers having a different perspective of the security situation in
schools than students and pupils.
In the interviews, teachers stress that physical fights, in both primary and secondary schools, are mainly
fist-fights, with no weapons or other tools involved. In those few cases when a weapon is implicated
in the fighting, it is generally a knife, a chain, or boxing gloves. Firearm incidents remain very rare: in
the 15 schools, two incidents were recorded (in one incident, a pistol was noted in the pocket of a
student, in another a student hit a classmate with a hand-made non-functioning pistol).
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AK-47
13%
Fake gun 4%
Pistol
28%
Unknown type
47%
Hunting rifle 8%
Source: KPIS
Figure 7.6  Types of SALW used in aggravated assaults, 2002
However, the administrators and teachers recognize that the security situation is less than perfect.
Several secondary schools have asked for the presence of a policeman in order to avoid violence. In
primary schools, teachers conduct bag searches, and regularly find knifes but never guns. Secondary
school teachers do not feel entitled to go through bags, although, in a number of interviews, they
expressed the wish to do so.
The threats are mainly perceived to be coming from the outside, on the way to and from school, or
related to youth from other schools, etc. In Kamenicë/Kamenica, for example, police units escort
students to the school buses to ensure that no gangs threaten them on the way to the bus. Teachers
find parents uncooperative and uninterested in the security situation in schools. In fact, in certain
ways they contribute to a negative security climate, as teachers at times receive verbal threats from
parents who are dissatisfied with their children’s performance.
These interviews confirm that the security situation in schools is less than perfect. It also shows that
the main threat is not small arms but fighting and intimidation without weapons, or with weapons
such as chains, knives, and iron bars. However, this does not mean that guns are absent from the
school environment. The two incidents show that guns are present at times. As information on issues
such as these generally does not reach teachers, it is probable that guns are more common than teachers
suggest.101
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VIII. Conclusions
Despite the recent war and the uncertainty over its future status, the situation in Kosovo does contain
some bright spots. In less than four years, the territory has witnessed the development and strengthening
of public institutions and the rule of law, as well as the emergence of an increasingly accountable security
sector. Though structural, social, and economic challenges remain, including widespread unemployment
and continued inter-communal tension, Kosovo’s progress has, in some ways, surpassed the expectations
of the international community.
A central obstacle to the future success of these efforts, however, is the continued widespread avail-
ability and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The findings of this SABA household survey confirm
that assault rifles and pistols continue to be trafficked from Serbia and Albania, and are owned by a
wide array of actors. In spite of continuous efforts by UNMIK and KFOR to register and collect these
arms, some 330,000–460,000 are still in the hands of civilians, organized criminal actors, and political
factions.
This study has shown that small arms misuse still represents a threat to the safety and well being of
Kosovans, as well as to the national and international staff of the UN administration and other agencies.
Though fatal and non-fatal injury rates appear to be on the decline, criminality—and especially crime
committed with firearms—is still a concern. Compared with other countries in the central and
eastern European region, small arms are misused in a disproportionately large number of homicides
and robberies.
The efforts of UNDP, particularly through its forthcoming WED programme, represent a potentially
important step, and should be closely monitored and evaluated. But collecting and destroying weapons
is only a first step. Although the findings of the SABA suggest that Kosovans may be willing, under
some circumstances, to hand over their weapons, their faith in both national and international security
providers varies. The proposed WED should therefore adopt modest objectives in the initial stages.
The permanent removal and disposal of small arms from Kosovo could potentially yield profound
developmental and symbolic dividends. It is a necessary, but not by itself a sufficient, step to securing
the stability and security of the territory and its people. Given the uncertainty that persists among its
neighbours, the task will be difficult. Nevertheless, if carried out with adequate political and financial
backing, and in tandem with ongoing development programming, the results could be promising for
Kosovo and the region.
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Endnotes
1 The SABA household survey drew on a number of
research instruments, including: (1) 1,200+ household sur-
vey; (2) 12 participatory focus groups in four representa-
tive regions; (3) 15 key informant interviews with ex-KLA
fighters from all seven operational zones; (4) interviews
with 29 teachers and administrators in 15 schools
throughout Kosovo; and (5) interviews with key personnel
in the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
(PISG), UNMIK, the OSCE and other actors in the security
sector. The SABA household survey team was also given
access to the UNMIK Police database (KPIS) and the
registry of the Pristina University Hospital.
2 This estimate is based on the following elements: Approxi-
mately 60–70 per cent of the 390,000 households in Kosovo
possess guns. The average rate of gun holdings among
these households is circa 1.4–1.7 weapons per household.
3 The issue of who has persecuted whom is contested 
terrain: Kosovo Serbs will at times attempt to justify
Milosevic’s persecution by reference to the way they were
treated in Kosovo in the last decades of communist rule.
4 For a similar argument, see Heinemann-Grüder and Paes
(2001, pp. 20–21).
5 It is important to remember that while these are not
‘ancient’ or ‘eternal’ hatreds, the ethnic conflicts have not
surged just in the last few years or even decade. Rather,
they date back to the emergence of nationalism as a
dominant political and social force in Europe in the nine-
teenth century (Malcolml, 1998, Introduction).
6 Figures from Living Standard Measurement Survey 2000,
cited in SOK (2002). The six per cent figure of the Kosovo
Serb minority comes from UNMIK (2002). Figures on the
ethnic composition in Kosovo are inherently controver-
sial, and have for many decades been used as a political
tool (for a brief discussion, see Malcolm, 1998, xxxi–xxxii).
7 In addition, the economic situation of the ethnic Serb
community tends to be worse than in the rest of Kosovo
(Paes and Matveeva, 2003).
8 For a vivid report on the situation of the returnees, see
Velijevic (2003). A more comprehensive picture is provided
in ICG (2002).
9 Support for moderate political leaders has gradually
weakened, however (Bieley, 2002).
10 In the second municipal elections, the boycott was total
in the divided city of Mitrovica.
11 This goes against the general trend, which is of a gradual
decline in electoral participation over the three elections,
from 79 per cent in 2000 to 53.9 per cent in 2002.
12 ICG (2001, p. 17). The only Kosovo Serb party 
participating in the Kosovo-wide elections, the ‘Return’
Party, today occupies these ten seats.
13 The Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) still has ‘reserved powers’ over the following
domains: dissolution of the assembly and calling for new
elections; final authority to approve the Kosovo budget;
final authority over the judicial system (appointment,
removal of judges and prosecutors), law enforcement and 
correctional institutions; control over the Kosovo
Protection Corps; external relations; control over 
cross-border/boundary transit of goods; protection of
minorities; administration of state or other publicly owned
property, etc. (UNDP, 2002a, Box 2.4).
14 Although the status of Montenegro differed from that of
Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Montenegro was a constituent republic of the Federation,
while Kosovo was part of Serbia), Kosovo did have 
substantial autonomy, and in many ways resembled
Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina
in terms of powers and prerogatives.
15 This is so even though Kosovo was always the least
developed part of Yugoslavia. For an overview of the 
situation in Albania, see UNDP (2002c).
16 The NATO operation ‘Essential Harvest’ of August-
September 2001 collected a total of 3,875 weapons and
397,625 mines, explosives, and ammunition (Small Arms
Survey, 2002, Table 7.9). The quality of the weapons was
on average not very high, however, and it seems that
many of the weapons most useful for fighting may have
been retained by the guerrillas.
17 Interviews, security sector personnel working in Kosovo,
27 February 2003.
18 Opinion polls in 2001 and 2002 indicate that close to 100
per cent of the Kosovo Albanians would vote in favour of
independence, and a similar share of Kosovo Serbs
would vote against (UNDP, 2002a, Box 2.5). 
19 Unemployment measured by ILO method, cited in
UNMIK (2002). 
20 UNMIK Police Press Release, 29 October 2002; see
UNDP (2003, p. 25).
21 The opinion survey conducted for this report indicated
that about 90 per cent of the respondents would go to
the police if they were robbed or seriously threatened
(see Annex 1). However, other UNDP opinion polls have
arrived at lower numbers; see UNDP (2002b, p. 24; 
2003, p. 28).
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22 Calculated from KPIS. The decline in inter-ethnic murder
rates should be interpreted with caution. It is less a con-
sequence of improved inter-ethnic relations than of the
fact that the communities are more separated today than
in the immediate post-conflict period.
23 Among the category ‘others’, 71 per cent felt ‘safe’ or
‘very safe’.
24 Other minority communities, such as Bosniacs, Roma,
and Turks, were covered in the survey. However, their
numbers were not sufficiently large to  produce statisti-
cally significant results. Hence these groups are not 
further discussed in the report.
25 As drivers’ licences were not issued for three years 
during the conflict, there are quite a few untrained and
poorly skilled drivers on the Kosovo roads.
26 By ‘centralization’ these men most likely meant central-
ization of political power in Pristina (as opposed to strong
local-level governance structures).
27 Hence they prefer the local component of the police
force to the international police force, although both are
part of the same organization–UNMIK Police.
28 Ministarstvo Unutrasˇnjin Poslova (Ministry of the Interior),
Serbia. 
29 The number of KFOR troops has declined by approxi-
mately 30 per cent from its original strength of 42,000
men and women.
30 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
22 January 2003.
31 For a discussion of the share of police holdings in total
SALW holdings, see Small Arms Survey (2001, Ch. 2).
32 However, there are allegations that the Yugoslav police,
as well as elements of the VJ, continue to be active
underground in certain enclaves, in particular in North
Mitrovica. According to one source consulted by SAS, 
40 Serb secret service officers operate in northern
Mitrovica.
33 UNMIK Police Daily Press Update, 27 January 2003 
<http://www.kosovopolice.org/english/dreports/DPU280103.htm>.
34 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
22 January 2003, 2 March 2003.
35 For an explanation of the multiplier concept, see Box 4.1.
36 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
22 January 2003.
37 This arrangement is part of the Statement of Principles
signed between the commanders of KFOR and the KPC
on 20 September 1999. Interview, personnel working in
Kosovo security sector, 22 January 2003.
38 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
28 February 2003.
39 This number is also confirmed by the IOM database of
ex-KLA combatants. According to this database, only
two per cent of combatants were active in the KLA
before 1998. The bulk joined in 1998 (36 per cent in the
first half, 21 per cent in the second half). The remainder,
i.e. more than 40 per cent, joined in 1999 (cited in
Heinemann-Grüder and Paes, 2001, p. 25).
40 Interview with ex-KLA combatant, undertaken by Kosovo
Initiative for Democratic Society (KIDS) for the SABA,
February 2003.
41 Interview with ex-KLA combatant, undertaken by KIDS
for the SABA, February 2003.
42 ‘Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation 
by the UCK’, signed on 20 June 1999, paras 22–26. 
Non-automatic long-barrelled guns were subject to 
special KFOR permission.
43 For example, in the village of Vladovo, US Marines dis-
armed around 200 KLA combatants (Heinmann-Grueder
and Paes, 2001, p. 19).
44 The background to this is that the Yugoslav army was
long successful in keeping the KLA—and hence KLA
armaments—at bay along the Kosovo borders in Albania.
The sudden withdrawal of the VJ in June 1999 led KLA
fighters to move swiftly (and thus only lightly armed) into
Kosovo, leaving large stocks behind (Ripley, 2000, p. 23).
45 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
27 February 2003.
46 Data provided by KFOR, March 2003.
47 Data provided by KFOR, March 2003.
48 Data provided by KFOR, March 2003.
49 Data provided by KFOR, March 2003.
50 For details on the armament requirements of ‘people’s
war’ tactics, see Small Arms Survey (2002, Ch. 2).
51 Data provided by KFOR, March 2003. OSCE puts the
number at 200. However, these numbers comprise only
those Bridge Watchers who are more or less full-time
militias. It is thought that, beyond these, a larger number
of supporters/reservists can be mobilized whenever
needed (cited in Paes and Matveeva, 2003, p. 36).
52 According to Gorjanc (2000, Table 4), Montenegro had
more than 13.5 weapons per 100 inhabitants.
53 Again, if Kosovo followed the general pattern across
Yugoslavia, 25 per cent should have been rifles and 
the rest largely pistols (calculated from Gorjanc, 2000,
Table 2).
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54 These data are not precise, since no census has been
conducted since 1991, and the inflows and outflows of
persons have been significant since then. Moreover, the
1991 data are unreliable, as the census was conducted
with ethno-political goals in mind. This calculation is
based on data from the Statistical Office of Kosovo, the
OSCE, and the SABA household survey.
55 For further details, see Annex 1.
56 The success rate of random searches in houses would
provide a good lower threshold for the ratio of households
that possess weapons. Precisely because the searches
are random, the chance of seizing a gun should be equal
to the proportion of households owning a gun: the only
reason it might be lower is that it is most likely that not all
guns will be found during a search, however thorough, as
concealment techniques can be very refined.
57 The claim, advanced by some interviewees, that every
single household in Kosovo holds guns seems implausible,
however. In fact, even intelligence-based KFOR operations
to seize weapons in households do not have a 100 per
cent success rate: rather, weapons are found in 70 per
cent of the interventions.
58 Obviously, neither KFOR nor police seizures are random,
and so the distribution of types and makes among 
the seized weapons might not perfectly reflect the 
distribution among civilians. This is particularly true of
KFOR seizures, which include a large number of militia
weapons caches. 
59 This information is also corroborated by the focus group of
children and youth in Gjilan/Gnjilane, which named various
shops where weapons were held under the counter.
60 Data provided by KFOR, March 2003.
61 In fact, approximately 70 per cent of WAC cards are in
the hands of bodyguards, although these do not serve
only political leaders.
62 Over and above this, there were a number of murders
and attempted murders, without indication of whether
guns were involved. Given what is known about guns in
murders in Kosovo (see Section VII), it can be assumed
that the percentage should be raised.
63 Interviews, OSCE, March 2003.
64 The demobilization of the KLA is discussed in Section III.
65 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
30 January 2003.
66 Calculated from KFOR (2002a). Some articles refer to
both international and national leaders.
67 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security and 
policies sector, 30 January 2003.
68 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
27 January 2003.
69 For details, see Box 6.1.
70 The 200,000 figure appears in Kanani (2002). 
71 Information gathered from interviews with ex-KLA militia,
undertaken by KIDS, February 2003; private security 
personnel, Kosovo, 27 February 2003; personnel working
in the security sector in Kosovo and Albania, April 2003.
72 Communication, personnel working in Kosovo security
sector, 5 April 2003; interview, personnel working in
Kosovo security sector, 27 February 2003.
73 Customs have recognised the difficulties presented by
the porousness of the ‘green border and boundary’ and
in March 2003, they introduced Mobile Anti Smuggling
Teams. They expect these teams to provide additional
interdiction capability along unapproved routes from the
boundary and along the border.
74 All personnel working in the Kosovo security sector were
of this opinion.
75 Put very simply, there are two main Balkan smuggling
routes which transport a range of illicit goods, one southern
and one northern. The entry point to the Balkans is Turkey.
The northern route then goes through Romania, and further:
either through Hungary and the Czech Republic into western
Europe, or passing by the Ukraine and Poland. The so-called
southern route passes through Bulgaria, FYROM, Kosovo,
and Albania on its way to Italy (Hajdinjak, 2002, p. 42).
76 There have been attempts to include Kosovans in the
highest echelons of the customs service, but the locals
have resigned after receiving repeated and serious
threats against themselves and their families (interview,
personnel working in Kosovo security sector, 28 February
2003; for details, see Hajdinjak, 2002).
77 At the checkpoints along the administrative boundary line,
KFOR was previously responsible for passenger control,
but has been replaced by the border police. Customs act
as a tax collection and enforcement agency on the admin-
istrative boundary line. Goods of Serbian and Montenegrin
origin are not subject to customs duty but are subject to
VAT and excise. Customs collect these taxes at the
boundary line from commercial consignments of goods.
78 Customs are making two important improvements in
2003. The first is the introduction of a new EU compliant
Customs Law. The second is a customs computer 
system to complement the new law. Both will provide for
effective risk analysis, and hold an intelligence database.
This will enable customs to concentrate their resources
on passengers and goods that present the highest risk,
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and facilitate passage for low risk and compliant
importers. Customs believe that this, alongside the
deployment of Mobile Anti Smuggling Units, will release
resources that should enable them to deploy more staff
on their protection of society responsibilities.
79 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
28 February 2003.
80 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
28 February 2003.
81 The only exception to this is radiation detection equip-
ment, which was acquired because of concerns that
Ukrainian contaminated building material was reaching
Kosovo (interview, personnel working in Kosovo security
sector, 28 February 2003).
82 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
28 February 2003.
83 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
28 February 2003.
84 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector, 
1 March 2003.
85 During the Yugoslav era, Bosnia and Herzegovina was
home to more than 40 per cent of the federation’s
defence industry, employing circa 38,000 workers. The
bulk of Yugoslav SALW production took place in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Since the end of the civil war in 1995,
production has been re-established. Small arms 
ammunition is produced at Konjic (Igman) and Gorazde
(Pobjeda), and exports of small arms are reported as
early as in 1998 (Small Arms Survey, 2003, p. 43).
86 Interview, personnel working in Kosovo security sector,
28 February 2003.
87 KIDS interviews with ex-KLA members.
88 The research team has not been able to obtain 
documentation on such trafficking, however.
89 Here the Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit [The Code of Lekë
Dukagjini] (1989) has been used.
90 It is worth noting that the reconciliation movement of the
early 1990s in Kosovo did not focus on guns, but
attempted to break the cycle of blood feuds within 
elements of Kosovan society.
91 KFOR may also issue weapons authorization cards, but
only to KPC members.
92 Regulation No. 2001/7 on the Authorisation of
Possession of Weapons in Kosovo, para. 8.6.
93 The types of weapons permitted are shotguns no greater
than of 12 bore gauge, hunting rifles of a maximum calibre
of 8mm, civilian small bore target rifles with a maximum
calibre of 6mm, civilian small bore target pistols with a
maximum calibre of 6mm, air-powered rifles and pistols
with a maximum calibre of 6mm. Weapons primarily 
manufactured for military use and military inventory
weapons are not eligible for registration.
94 The UNMIK Weapons Registration Office, now responsible
for the registration of hunting and recreational weapons,
was established with financial and technical assistance
from UNDP/ISAC in support of the Kosovan Small Arms
Regulatory Framework.
95 The membership rate of the various hunting associations
in Kosovo, in 2001, ranged from as few as ten members
to more than a thousand (information derived from a list
of hunters associations, Members of Hunters’ Federation
of Kosova in year 2001 and other information).
96 Information obtained by the Small Arms Survey from the
Pristina University Hospital.
97 This shows that the concern with reckless drivers of
many women in the focus group research (see above
Section  III) corresponds well to the statistically most
important dangers in Kosovo.
98 This is not to say that crime levels in general are low: 
in fact, smuggling, contraband, and other forms of 
economic crime are rife.
99 Given different national recording procedures, comparisons
should be made only cautiously. UNMIK police officers
responsible for recording the information also come from
various countries, with very different classification systems
and uneven knowledge of the guns most often found in
the Balkan region. As a consequence, the reliability of
original police classifications might suffer. As a result,
Table 7.2 should be read with caution.
100 The 15 schools were as follows: Primary schools: 
Elena Gjika (Pristina), Vaso Pashe Shkodrani (Pejë/Pec´),
Janjeva (Lipjan/Lipljane), Bashkimi (Gllogovc/Glogovac),
Edmond Hoxha, Junik (Deçan/Decˇane), 7 Marsi
(Suharekë/Suva Reka), Ponesh (Gjilan/Gnjilane).
Secondary schools: Economy, Ferizaj/Urosˇevac
(Ferizaj/Urosˇevac), Economy, Kamenicë/Kamenica
(Kamenicë/Kamenica), Shala (Lipjan/Lipljane), Sami
Frasheri, Pristina, Mitrovica South (Mitrovica), Economy
Podujevë/Podujevo (Podujevë/Podujevo), Technical
Secondary School, Prizren.
101 The interviewer undertook two informal interviews with
students of a secondary school. In both interviews, it was
claimed that students have access to arms, and carry
arms from time to time in school.
Annex 1: Responses to selected questions of the SABA 
household survey
The SABA household survey, commissioned by UNDP/ISAC for this study, was conducted throughout
Kosovo by Index Kosova (a joint venture with BBSS Gallup International) between 4 and 10 February
2003. It comprised face-to-face interviews with 1,264 people, 259 Kosovo Serb and 1,005 mainly
Kosovo Albanian respondents. In order to increase the reliability of the results regarding the Serb
minority, its share among the respondents was chosen to be higher than their percentage of the entire
population of Kosovo.
The sample was multi-staged random, according to the residential (urban/rural) and ethnic characteristics
of the population. The selection of a household was carried out according to the ‘random route’ method.
Men above the age of 18 were targeted as the main gun owners.
Q.2a Whom would you address/call, if your car or motorcycle, or other asset were robbed? 
Q.3a Whom would you address/call, if someone threatened to kill you?
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Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Relatives, friends and neighbors 2 2 1
KPS 84 90 17
UNMIK Police 11 6 65
KFOR 1 1 6
Private security company <1 0 <1
Community elders <1 <1 1
Head of family <1 <1 <1
Other 1 1 3
Nothing 0 <1 2
Don’t know <1 <1 5
Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Relatives, friends and neighbors 4 4 3
KPS 80 87 13
UNMIK Police 8 4 56
KFOR 4 3 14
Private security company <1 <1 <1
Community elders 0 0 0
Head of family <1 <1 2
Other 1 1 2
Nothing 1 <1 3
Refused <1 0 <1
Don’t know 1 <1 7
Q.6a Do you think that there are too many guns in society? 
Q.6b In which parts of society?
Q.10 Compared to one year ago, is the security in this area better or worse? 
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Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Yes 47 47 46
No 21 20 32
Refused 1 1 <1
Don’t know 31 33 21
Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
(multiple answers allowed)
Criminal groups 70 71 54
Businessmen 14 15 1
Politicians 7 8 0
In households 23 25 1
Among ex-fighters/ex-military 14 12 37
Whole society 6 3 26
The youth 2 3 0
Hunters 2 2 0
K-Serbs 1 1 0
K-Albanians 1 0 12
Other 3 3 0
Don’t know 8 9 5
Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Improved 61 65 19
Got worse 10 11 6
Same 27 22 70
Volatile (up and down) 2 2 4
Don’t know <1 <1 <1
Q.17 In your opinion, how many households in your neighbourhood have firearms?
Q.18 Why do you think people keep firearms? 
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Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
All households <1 <1 1
Almost all households 1 1 2
Most households (3/4) 2 2 1
Every other household (1/2) 2 2 5
Few households (1/4) 11 11 13
Almost no households 16 16 17
Not a single household 18 19 5
Refused 6 1 57
Don’t know 43 47 0
Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
(multiple answers allowed)
Personal protection 65 67 48
Protect property 16 17 5
Protect community 1 1 <1
Political security 6 4 27
Work <1 <1 2
Sport shooting 3 3 3
Left from the war 7 8 6
For hunting 40 40 39
Valued family possession 3 3 4
Part of the tradition 5 6 2
Hobby/own will 2 2 0
Arrogance 1 1 0
To commit crimes/killings/threats 1 1 0
Revenge 1 2 0
Low awareness/naïve 1 1 0
Others 2 2 <1
Refused <1 <1 2
Don’t know 8 8 11
Q.19b On average, what types/makes do you think are the most common in Kosovo?
Q.20a If your household could own a gun legally, would you choose to do so?
Q.20c Why would your household choose to own a firearm?
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Answers  K/A* % K/S** %
(multiple answers allowed)
Pistols/Revolvers 66 40
Automatic rifle (such as AK-47) 29 56
Hunting rifle (single shot, bolt) 57 34
Shotgun (non-automatic or pump) 1 0
Medium or heavy machine gun 6 0
Mortar <1 0
RPGs <1 0
Grenade 5 7
Other <1 2
Don’t know 3 2
Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Yes 40 38 61
No 54 56 33
Refused 1 1 2
Don’t know 5 5 4
Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
(multiple answers allowed)
To protect myself/family 69 70 64
To protect my property 18 19 11
To protect my community 3 3 4
For political reasons 4 0 31
For my work 1 1 1
Sport shooting 3 3 3
Because all other people have guns 1 1 0
For hunting 32 32 31
Other 4 4 1
Don’t know <1 <1 0
Q.22 If a person from your neighbourhood, for whatever reason, would need a weapon, where do
you think he/she could get one?
Q.21b How likely do you think it is that people in your neighbourhood will hand in their weapons,
if there are any such, in exchange for investments in your municipality?
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Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
(multiple answers allowed)
Would not be able to get one 6 6 6
Would have to ask 4 3 8
Buy one from the black market 14 14 15
Buy one from someone else 4 4 1
Know of a hidden cache 1 <1 2
Buy from a friend in the armed forces 2 2 <1
Borrow one 4 4 6
Get from family member 1 2 <1
Get in specific town/region 1 1 2
Get a licence and buy a gun 12 12 8
Police/KPS 1 1 0
Hunters' society <1 <1 0
KFOR/UNMIK <1 <1 0
Other <1 1 0
Refused 2 1 3
Don’t know 58 58 56
Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Very likely 22 24 2
Somewhat likely 29 31 6
Somewhat unlikely 6 5 11
Very unlikely 16 13 45
Refused 1 <1 3
Don’t know 27 26 33
Q.5 Many people feel that having a gun helps to protect their families. Other people believe
that having guns is dangerous to their families. Which opinion do you agree with?
Q.7 What type of violent crime and violence occurs most often in this area nowadays?
Kosovo and the Gun
Small Arms Survey    Special Report
Page 51
Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Helps protect 20 18 40
Makes no difference 6 5 16
Is dangerous 71 74 36
Refused 1 1 <1
Don’t know 2 1 7
Answers  All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
(multiple answers allowed)
Armed robbery 22 24 3
Theft (victim not aware) 46 47 36
Kidnapping 4 4 3
Threats 13 14 11
Murder 25 27 5
Assault/beatings 10 10 16
Rape 7 7 0
Gangs 3 3 2
Fighting 3 3 1
Violence related to smuggling 3 3 2
Revenge 1 1 2
Domestic violence 2 2 3
Drunken disorder 2 <1 14
Burglary 17 16 25
Drug dealing 7 6 11
Other 1 1 2
There is no violence 20 21 9
Don’t know 8 6 19
Q.4 Ideally, who do you think should be responsible for security?
*K/A: Kosovo Albanian respondents
**K/S: Kosovo Serb respondents
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Answers All respondents % K/A* % K/S** %
Local authorities 3 2 7
UNMIK 6 6 2
KFOR 9 9 5
KPS 66 71 8
UNMIK Police 3 2 7
KPC 2 2 0
Local militias 3 <1 28
The neighborhood or family 1 1 0
Co-ordination center <1 0 3
The people 1 1 0
Kosovo government 1 1 0
MUP/Serb Police/Army 3 0 38
Others 1 2 0
Don’t know 2 1 3
Annex 2: SABA household survey questionnaire
Q.1a. Has anyone in your household been injured in an accident (in the last three months)? 
1.  Yes 
2.  No
3. Refused
4. Don’t know 
Q.1b. Has anyone in this household been a victim of a crime or a violent encounter (in the last
three months)? (Interviewer: If any such, after the first case probe) Has anyone else?
1.  Yes Go to Annex 1 and fill out for each incident
2.  No
3. Refused
4. Don’t know 
Q.1c. Has anyone in this household been threatened or made to feel fearful (in the last three
months)? (Interviewer: If any such, after the first case probe) Has anyone else?
1.  Yes Go to Annex 1 and fill out for each incident
2.  No
3. Refused
4. Don’t know 
Q.2a. Whom would you address/call, if your car or motorcycle, or other asset were robbed? (Single
response)
1. Turn to relatives, friends and neighbors for help
2. Go to KPS
3. Go to UNMIK Police
4. Go to KFOR
5. Go to private security company or similar
6. Turning to community elders
7. Turning to the head of the family
96. Other (specify) ____________________
97. Nothing (no point in doing anything)
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
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Q.2b. If such an event has happened, how likely is that you will do any of the following? Is it very
likely (VL), somewhat likely (SL), somewhat unlikely (SU) or very unlikely (VU) that you
will … (Interviewer: Read out)
VL SL SU VU Ref.* DK**
a) turn to community elders? 1 2 3 4 5 6
b) turn to relatives, friends or neighbors? 1 2 3 4 5 6
c) shoot/attack thief if possible? 1 2 3 4 5 6
Q.3a. Whom would you address/call, if someone threatened to kill you? (Single response)
1.  Turn to relatives, friends and neighbors for help
2.  Go to KPS
3.  Go to UNMIK Police
4.  Go to KFOR
5.  Find private protection (security company or similar)
6.  Turn to community elders
7.  Turn to the head of the family  
96. Other (specify) ___________________
97. Nothing (no point in doing anything)
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
Q.3b. If such an event has happened, how likely is that you will do any of the following? Is it very
likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely or very unlikely that you will… (Interviewer:
Read out)
VL SL SU VU Ref. DK
a) turn to community elders? 1 2 3 4 5 6
b) turn to relatives, friends or neighbors? 1 2 3 4 5 6
c) threaten back? 1 2 3 4 5 6
d) shoot/attack thief if possible? 1 2 3 4 5 6
Q.4. Ideally, who do you think should be responsible for security? (Single response)
1. Local authorities
2. UNMIK
3. KFOR
4. Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
5. UNMIK Police
6. Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) (Kosovo Albanian + sub-set only)
7. Private security firms
8. Local militias
9. The neighborhood or family
10. Co-ordination center (Kosovo Serb + sub-set only)
97. Others (specify) ____________________
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
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*Refused
**Didn’t know
Q.5. Many people feel that having a gun helps to protect their families. Other people believe
that having guns is dangerous to their families. Which opinion do you agree with?
1. Helps protect
2. Makes no difference
3. Is dangerous
4. Refused
5. Don’t know
Q.6a. Do you think that there are too many guns in society?
1. Yes Go to Q.6b
2. No Skip to Q.7
3. Refused Skip to Q.7
4. Don’t know Skip to Q.7
Q.6b. (Filtered) In which parts of society? (Multiple response)
1. Criminal groups
2. Businessmen
3. Politicians
4. In households
5. Among ex-fighters/ex-military
7. Other (specify) _________
8. Whole society 
9. Refused
10. Don’t know
Q.7. (Ask All) What type of violent crime and violence problems occur most often in this area
nowadays? (Multiple response)
1. Armed robbery
2. Theft (victim not aware)
3. Kidnapping
4. Threats
5. Murder
6. Assault/beatings
7. Rape
8. Gangs
9. Fighting
10. Violence related to smuggling
11. Revenge
12. Domestic violence
13. Drunken disorder
14. Burglary
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15. Drug dealing
96. Other (specify) __________
97. There are no violent crimes and violence problems whatsoever
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
Q.8. Do you think your town/neighbourhood is safer, the same or more dangerous than other
areas in Kosovo?
1. Safer
2. Same
3. More dangerous
4. Refused
5. Don’t know
Q.9. Since when has your household lived in this area? 
1. Less than a year Skip to Q.11
2. One year to 4 years Go to Q.10
3. More than 4 years Go to Q.10
Q.10. (Filtered) Compared to one year ago, is the security in this area better or worse?
1. Improved
2. Gotten worse
3. Stayed the same
4. Volatile: goes up and down
5. Refused
6. Don’t know
Q.11. Do you think that improving the control of firearms in Kosovo would increase security?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused
4. Don’t know
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Q.12. How much do you think each of the following will increase security? Do you think that
tightening border control will increase security a lot, somewhat, make no difference or
make the situation worse in Kosovo? And how much will licensing for legal firearms
possession increase security…
A lot Somewhat The same Worse Ref. DK
a) Tightening 
border control 1 2 3 4 5 6
b) Licensing for legal
firearms possession 1 2 3 4 5 6
c) Control of arm sellers 1 2 3 4 5 6
Q.13. What do you think is an appropriate age for a person to possess a gun?
1. Younger than 15 years
2. 16–20 years
3. 21–30 years
4. Older than 31
5. A man does not need to have a gun
6. Refused
7. Don’t know
Q.14. What do you think is an appropriate age for starting to handle weapons?
1. Younger than 9 years old
2. 10–14 years old
3. 15–18 years old
4. 19–21 years old
5. Above 22 years old
6. Should not start handling a gun
7. The later the better
8. Refused
9. Don’t know
Q.15a. On average, how often do you hear weapon-shots in your neighbourhood? 
(Show card)
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Q.15b. And apart from UNMIK Police, KPS, KPC (Kosovo Albanian + sub-set only) and KFOR,
how often do you see firearms in your neighbourhood? (Show card)
Q.15a Q.15b
Hear See
Never 1 1
Less often 2 2
Once a month 3 3
Once a week 4 4
Several times a week 5 5
Daily 6 6
Refused 7 7
Don’t know 8 8
Q.16. How do you think that the number of firearms in your neighbourhood has changed in the
last three years? Has it decreased, increased or remained the same?
1. Has decreased
2. Has increased
3. The same 
4. Refused
5. Don’t know
‘Please remember that all we are talking about is strictly confidential. We do not want the names
of any people. We are only trying to understand the situation in this community.’
Q.17. In your opinion, how many households in your neighbourhood have firearms? (Show card)
1. All households
2. Almost all households
3. Most households (three-quarters)
4. Every other household (one out of two)
5. Few households (a fourth)
6. Almost no households
7. Not a single household
6. Refused
7. Don’t know
Q.18. Why do you think people keep firearms? (Multiple response)
1. Personal protection
2. Protect property
3. Protect community
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4. Political security
5. Work
6. Sport shooting
7. Left from the war
8. For hunting
9. Valued family possession
10. Part of the tradition
97. Others (specify) ____________
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
Q.19a. Among those households that possess a gun, on average, how many firearms do you think
they have?
__ (record actual number) Go to Q.19b
97. None Skip to Q.20
98. Refused Skip to Q.20
99. Don’t know Skip to Q.20
Q.19b. (Filtered: Ask if any to previous Q.19a) On average, what types/makes do you think are
the most common in Kosovo? (Multiple response)
1. Pistols/revolvers
2. Automatic rifle (such as AK-47)
3. Hunting rifle (single-shot, bolt)
4. Shotgun (non-automatic or pump)
5. Medium or heavy machine gun
6. Landmine
7. Grenade
8. Mortar
9. RPGs (rocket-propeller grenade launcher)
97. Other (specify) ______________
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
Q.20a. If your household could own a gun legally, would you choose to do so?
1. No Skip to Q.20b
2. Yes Go to Q.20c
3. Refused Skip to Q.21
4. Don’t know Skip to Q.21
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Q.20b. (Filtered: Ask those, who would NOT own in Q.21a) Why would your household choose
NOT to own a weapon? (Multiple response)
1. Do not like guns
2. Dangerous for family in the house (i.e. children)
3. Don’t need one
4. Dangerous for community
5. Don’t know how to use one
6. Afraid
7. Only women in the house
8. License too costly/difficult to obtain
97. Other (specify) ________________
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
Q.20c. (Filtered: Ask those, who WOULD own in Q.20a) Why would your household choose
to own a firearm? (Multiple response)
1. To protect myself/my family
2. To protect my property
3. To protect my community
4. For political reasons
5. For my work
6. Sport shooting
7. Because all other people have guns
8. For hunting
97. Other (specify) _______________
98. Refused
99. Don’t know
Q.21a. Under what conditions do you think people in your neighbourhood would be willing to
hand in their guns?
1. Would be willing to do it today
2. Improvement of the economic situation of the community
3. If political settlement regarding the future status of Kosovo
4. For cash
5. If part of an agreement between local communities
6. If there would be less crime
7. If there would be severe penalty 
8. If we would get a regular army (Kosovo Albanian + sub-set)
9. If Serb police/military would return (Kosovo Serb + sub-set)
96. Never
97. Other (specify) _______________
98. Refused to answer
99. Don’t know
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Q.21b. How likely do you think it is that people in your neighbourhood will hand in their weapons,
if there are any such, in exchange for investments in your municipality? Is it…
1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Somewhat unlikely
4. Very unlikely
5. Refused
6. Don’t know
Q.22. If a person from your neighbourhood, for whatever reason, would need a weapon, where do
you think he could get one? (Multiple response)
1. Would not be able to get one
2. Would have to ask 
3. Buy one from the black market
4. Buy one from someone else
5. Know of a hidden cache
6. Buy from a friend in the armed forces
7. Borrow one 
8. Get from family member
9. Get in specific town/region (specify) _____________
10. Get a licence and buy a gun
97.  Other  (specify) ______________
98.  Refused
97.  Don’t know
Q.23. Do you know who is allowed to keep guns AT HOME legally now? (Multiple response)
1. No, I don’t know
2. Police and soldiers
3. People who work in ministries
4. High officials
5. Local officials (politicians, civil servants)
6. Body/security guards
7. Any adult
8. Hunters
9. Important businessmen
97. Other (specify)________________
98. Refused
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Annex 3: Variables in the feasibility and volatility indices
Feasibility Index
Volatility Index
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Variable Available indicators
(per municipality) Assumptions
Legitimate economic opportunities Tax collection (UNMIK, 2003) The more taxes are collected, the more 
people are involved in legitimate economic 
activities.
Trust in and cooperation with Electoral participation rates The more people vote, the more they trust 
public authorities in % (OSCE, 2002) and are willing to cooperate with public 
and international authorities.
Gun scepticism, attitudes towards Household survey – The more sceptical people are towards
weapons collection composite index of answers guns, the more they will be willing to 
to questions, Q.5, Q.6a, cooperate with UNDP on a WED program. 
Q.18, Q.20a, Q.21a, Q.21b 
(see Annex 2)
Variable Indicators
(per municipality) Assumptions
Extent of armed violence/gun misuse, Murder rates with firearms in The higher the firearms related crime and
numbers of SALW in circulation 2002 per 100,000 (calculated injury rates, the larger the small arms 
from KPIS) problem.
Recorded incidents involving 
weapons, 2002 per 100,000 
(UNMIK Police, 2002)
Number of small arms 
inflicted injuries per 100,000 
(Pristina University Hospital)
Household survey – The higher the perceived and experienced 
composite index of answers violence and insecurity, the larger the 
to questions Q.1b, Q.1c, Q.8, need for a WED programme. 
Q.10, Q.15b, Q.16, and Q.17 
(see Annex 2)
Continued demand for guns and Ethnic distribution, computed More ethnic disparity hightens the
ethnic tensions into the % of minority risks of inter-ethnic clashes. 
community among 
municipality population 
(OSCE, 2002)
Household survey – The more willing people are to hold guns, 
composite index of answers and the keener they are to keep them for 
to questions Q.18 and Q.20a personal and political safety.
Prevalence of illicit activities Reported smuggling The more smuggling incidents occur, the 
incidents and caches seized more people are involved in illicit activities  
(various databases) linked with weapons ownership.
Number of closed The higher the level of unemployment, the 
businesses (SOK, June 2002) more people risk getting involved in illicit 
activities linked with weapons ownership.
Annex 4: Kosovo municipalities ranked according to the 
feasibility and volatility indices
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Municipality Feasibility Index Volatility Index
Value Rank Value Rank
Vushtrri/Vucˇitrn 74.12 1 51.23 6
Viti/Vitina 72.21 2 32.10 24
Deçan/Decˇane 72.01 3 30.73 25
Malishevë/Malisˇevo 67.81 4 29.81 27
Istog/Istok 65.70 5 36.27 18
Shtime/Sˇtimlje 64.34 6 30.57 26
Kaçanik/Kacˇanik 64.26 7 36.28 17
Pejë/Pec´ 64.03 8 71.70 1
Klinë/Klina 63.92 9 44.02 12
Prishtinë/Prisˇtina 63.81 10 50.27 7
Suharekë/Suva Reka 61.72 11 39.80 15
Prizren/Prizren 60.20 12 48.59 9
Rahovec/Orahovac 59.63 13 32.16 22
Gjilan/Gnjilane 59.24 14 39.06 16
Skënderaj/Srbica 59.19 15 35.51 19
Ferizaj/Urosˇevac 58.83 16 25.47 28
Gjakovë/-Dakovica 57.39 17 68.01 2
Obiliq/Obilic´ 54.30 18 32.14 23
Dragash/Dragasˇ 54.05 19 49.13 8
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 51.31 20 64.58 3
Podujevë/Podujevo 50.19 21 40.17 14
Gllogovc/Glogovac 48.65 22 25.30 29
Lipjan/Lipljane 45.91 23 52.19 4
Kamenicë/Kamenica 44.44 24 32.19 21
Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje 38.94 25 45.77 11
Shtërpcë/Sˇtrpce 29.14 26 32.53 20
Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok 27.70 27 43.35 13
Zveqan/Zvecˇane 27.02 28 51.90 5
Novobërdë/Novo Brdo 26.37 29 16.01 30
Leposaviq/Leposavic´ 23.54 30 46.44 10
Annex 5: Data used in figures
Section III
Section IV
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Homicides/100,000 Robberies/100,000 Aggravated 
assaults/100,000
Albania, 2001 16.88 7.39 4.41
Bulgaria, 2000 6.19 52.08 0.93
Croatia, 2000 5.96 16.76 21.09
Estonia, 2000 13.73 335.65 32.61
Hungary 2000 3.53 34.79 75.88
Kosovo 2001 4.45 20.05 9.3
FYROM 2002 6.53 22.72 22.96
Romania, 2000 7.44 30.30 5.50
Slovenia, 2000 4.07 27.06 21.92
Figure 3.1 Kosovo crime rates in comparative perspective
Sources: KPIS; Interpol (categories 1, 3, and 4.1.1). Population estimate for Kosovo from SOK (2002)
Weapons Percentage Total number
Assault rifles 20 983
Machine guns 1 34
Pistols 44 2148
Rifles 15 742
Rocket launchers 1 46
Shotguns 15 738
Sub-machine guns (SMG) 2 108
Other (air rifles, grenades, sniper rifles etc.) 1 75
Unknown 1 57
Total 100 4931
Figure 4.1 SALW type seized by the police, 2000–2002
Source: Calculated from KPIS
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Region Number of seizures Percentage SALW Percentage population 
seizures
Border 37 0.8 –
Gjilan/Gnjilane 512 10.4 17
Mitrovica 850 17.2 13
Pejë/Pec´ 1175 23.8 15
Pristina 1776 36.0 37
Prizren 581 11.8 19
Total 4931 100 101
Figure 4.4 Geographic distribution of police seizures, mid-2000 to end-2002
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Calculated from KPIS
Weapons type KFOR seizure operations Weapons Amnesty
Rifles 120 417
Pistols 30 75
Machine guns 7 24
Mortars 2 1
Anti-tank 12 45
Rockets/ Missiles 4 9
Grenades 409 726
Mines 23 94
Ammunition 31347 59200
Misc. items* 557 895
Total (excluding ammunition and misc.) 607 1391
Figure 4.5 Comparison of the yields of the KFOR seizure operations and
weapons amnesty, 15 March–15 April 2002
*‘Miscellaneous items’ include uniforms, gas masks, jerrycans,  etc.
Source: KFOR
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Multinational Rifles Pistols Machine Mortars ATs  
brigade (MNB) guns
Year 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
FSU Force 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNB Central 358 501 157 184 0 21 0 3 17 50
MNB East 300 51 53 19 0 5 0 23 151 5
MNB North-East 90 598 46 139 0 9 0 35 17 32
MNB South-West 559 262 123 110 0 7 0 0 139 20
MSU (Military 
Specialized Unit) 30 13 15 13 0 0 1 0 5 2
Total 1339 1426 394 467 * 0 42 1 61 329 109
Figure 4.6 Weapons seized by KFOR troops in 2001 and 2002
*Total includes one pistol seized by KFOR Headquarters
Source: KFOR
Multinational Rockets Grenades Mines Ammunition Misc.  
brigade (MNB)
Year 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
FSU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNB Central 0 22 0 498 0 70 0 91526 0 1272
MNB East 0 2 0 950 0 5 0 3084 0 286
MNB North-East 0 17 0 335 0 6 0 97924 0 1442
MNB South-West 0 7 2 195 0 27 200 31526 0 312
MSU 12 2 0 9 0 0 5 929 250 15
Total 12 50 2 1987 0 108 205 224989 250 3327
Section VII
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Municipality Firearms Knives Beatings
1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002
June-Dec. June-Dec. June-Dec.
Deçan/Decˇane – 1 – 3 – 2
Dragash/Dragasˇ – – – – 1 1
Ferizaj/Urosˇevac 3 4 3 4 1 7
Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje – 1 – 12 5 28
Gjakovë/-Dakovica – 3 – 2 – 4
Gjilan/Gnjilane 7 – 1 5 – 6
Gllogovc/Glogovac 6 3 4 11 3 14
Istog/Istok – – – – – 3
Kaçanik/Kacˇanik – 3 – 4 – 5
Kamenicë/Kamenica 1 5 – 1 2 5
Klinë/Klina 1 2 – – 2 6
Leposaviq/Leposavic´ – – – – – 1
Lipjan/Lipljane 1 2 0 11 2 16
Malishevë/Malisˇevo 3 2 2 1 3 19
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 7 2 1 4 4 5
Novobërdë/Novo Brdo – – – – – –
Obiliq/Obilic´ – 3 – 3 – 16
Pejë/Pec´ 2 3 1 – – 2
Podujevë/Podujevo 5 7 2 4 11 14
Prishtinë/Prisˇtina 43 32 23 102 46 310
Prizren/Prizren 1 2 – 4 2 9
Rahovec/Orahovac – 2 – 2 – –
Shtime/Sˇtimlje – 3 – 3 – 7
Skënderaj/Srbica 5 4 – 3 2 6
Shtërpcë/Sˇtrpce 2 – – – 1 –
Suharekë/Suva Reka – – – 2 1 2
Viti/Vitina 3 2 1 1 1 1
Vushtrri/Vucˇitrn 9 8 3 4 3 24
Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok – – – – – –
Zveqan/Zvecˇane – – – – – –
Other 1 4 3 1 10 8
Total 100 98 44 187 100 512
Figure 7.1 Hospital reporting on reasons for visit/injury
Source: Pristina University Hospital statistics obtained by SAS
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Type of crime Murder Kidnapping Robbery* Aggravated
Type of SALW involved assault*
AK-47 6 2 5 7**
Pistol 8 3 13 15***
Shotgun 1 - 1 -
Hunting rifle 2 - 1 4
Fake gun 0 - 1 2
Grenade 1 - 1 -
Machine gun - - 2 -
Unknown type 33 2 53 25
Figures 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 
Types of small arms used in crimes, 2002
Note: Several guns were sometimes used to commit one crime. In the case of murders, one gun was sometimes used to commit several
murders.
*These are based on a random sample comprising 50 per cent of the total number of cases.
**Includes one gun recorded as ‘automatic rifle’.
*** Includes two guns recorded as ‘handgun’. 
Source: KPIS
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Interviews
Fifteen interviews with KLA ex-combatants, undertaken by Kosova Initiative for Democratic Society
(KIDS) for the SABA household survey, February 2003. Nine of the ex-KLA interviewees had higher
positions in the KLA hierarchy; the other six were soldiers. The interviewees come from all seven oper-
ational zones of the KLA (Dikagjini, Pashtrik, Drenica, Llapi, Nerodene, Shala, and Karadak). At cer-
tain periods of the war, two of the officers interviewed were in charge of logistics, and in particular of
arms supplies.
Fifteen interviews in schools throughout Kosovo: 
Primary schools: Elena Gjika (Pristina), Vaso Pashe Shkodrani (Pejë/Pec´), Janjeva (Lipjan/Lipljane),
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